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The Overreaction Hypothesis and share price overreaction has been a widely researched 
phenomenon since the 1980s, although most work has focused on longer-term share return 
reversals. As an emerging market and part of the BRICS collective, South Africa provides an 
interesting investment environment within which to investigate this phenomenon. Limited 
research has been done in South Africa on share price overreaction, again nearly all focusing on 
the longer term. This dissertation examined short term overreaction (over 1 and 5-day periods) 
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) over the period July 2000 to June 2015. 
Furthermore, periods of financial crisis were isolated from the full sample period and tested 
separately, in order to assess whether periods of financial instability affect the magnitude of 
share price overreaction on the JSE. 
 
Whereas the common approach in this field is to investigate overreaction on a relative basis 
(for example by ranking share returns over a prior period and focusing on extreme relative 
performances), this thesis follows other literature that examines share return reversals 
following extreme one-day share price changes beyond absolute cut-off values (in this case ±5% 
and ±10%). The methodology considered an abnormal returns measure based on total return 
index values, and used a multivariate regression to test for one day and five day share return 
reversals. The effect of average prior returns, market volatility, company size, value, price-to-
earnings and book-to-market ratios on abnormal returns were also considered. Lastly, a 
portfolio strategy based on one day and five day return reversals following large positive or 
negative one-day returns was investigated to test for usability as a possible trading strategy.  
 
Significant evidence was collected in support of short-term reversals. The results remained valid 
after robustness checks, and consistent coefficients were obtained for all variables, except the 
book-to-market ratio. A notable portion of the observed abnormal returns were unexplained by 
the conventional effects of company size and value. There was no statistically significant effect 
due to the Global Financial Crisis, in spite of a higher frequency of large price shifts during this 
period. A trading strategy employing these insights did not provide statistically significant risk-
adjusted excess returns relative to the All Share Index when traded frequently, thus supporting 
the view that the JSE is at least weak-form efficient given transaction costs.  
 
This study contributes to the market efficiency literature on the JSE, but also for the first time 
investigates very short term share return reversals and overreaction within the South African 
context using an absolute extreme share return approach, as opposed to a relative share 
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Chapter 1: Background and Introduction 
 
Equities are a highly speculative and interesting asset class, even more so in a developing 
economy with sophisticated financial markets such as South Africa. Understanding what 
variables drive and sustain abnormal returns is the subject of much research, and   the ability 
to predict investment opportunities based on discernible patterns is a strategic advantage for 
any investor, institutional or individual alike. In this regard, there have been numerous studies 
internationally on the phenomenon of stock price overreaction and a subsequent reversal 
effect. In South Africa there are many examples of large price movements which reversed 
within a very short period. For instance, Lonmin Plc gained 23.13% on March 7th 2016, but 
lost 9.98% the following day1. Events like these lead to the question of whether extreme 
absolute movements in daily share prices on the JSE are in general the result of investor 
overreaction, and hence can function as the basis for a possible trading strategy. This forms 
the underlying rationale for this study. 
 
The stock market overreaction hypothesis states that, following a sharp increase or decrease 
in price, a stock price movement usually reverses itself (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985). This 
overreaction may be due to market participants potentially weighting information 
asymmetrically as a result of behavioural biases (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Less extreme 
changes may be attributed to investor needs which mandate portfolio or other changes, but 
large price shifts are more likely due to new information or the expectations that surround 
such information.  Bowman and Iverson (1998) posit that the behaviour of equities that 
experience large price shifts provide an opportunity to test if new information is quickly and 
completely incorporated into these prices, or if there is actually overreaction. If this is a 
consistent phenomenon then there is scope to inform trading when equity prices deviate 
from what fundamental analysis would estimate to be the fair value. The ability to establish 
the extent and timeline of this could inform short, medium or long term equity dealings.  
                                                          
1 Source: Google Finance 
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The focus of most previous studies (mentioned in Chapter 2) has been on testing for the 
Overreaction Hypothesis and the identification of possible trading strategies within the 
overall market, or even within a specific industry or sector. A limited number of studies 
investigated the South African equity market or other African equity markets in general. 
Existing research on share return reversals in South Africa focus on the long term and is 
mainly concerned with examining portfolio strategies and their performance over months or 
years. Furthermore, although some studies have looked at this phenomenon during the 
Global Financial Crisis and in other countries, this has not been done for short-term reversals 
for South Africa, especially as a comparative study of the periods before and after the crisis. 
This study extends prior literature by focusing on short term return reversals, the returns 
behaviour as influenced by the Global Financial Crisis, and a comparative study of positive 
and negative price shocks within the context of South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE).  
 
The JSE which was founded in 1887, has a market capitalisation in excess of $ 1007 billion, 
and is operated by the JSE Limited, a company which is itself listed on the JSE (JSE, 2015). It is 
a highly active market with the average number of trades per day in 2014 being 185,936 and 
an average daily trading value of R 281 million in 2015 (Parsons, 2015). The JSE has for the last 
five years in a row been ranked as the best regulated exchange globally by the World 
Economic Forum (Global Competitiveness Report, 2014), and is South Africa’s only licensed, 
full service exchange, and Africa’s largest. 
 
1.1 Purpose and Nature of the Study  
 
This study will investigate equity price behaviour and short term share return reversals on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) from July 2000 to June 2015, which contains the tail end 
of the post-Dot Com bubble and the entire Global Financial Crisis, as well as the post-Global 
Crisis Recovery period to mid-2015. The Global Financial Crisis from 2007 to 2008 was a 
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turning point for financial markets and economic systems the world over. It had the potential 
to change investment and credit allocation as well as alter investor behaviour and decision 
making if there was contagion in the JSE from the Sub Prime mortgage crisis and Global 
Financial Crisis. As a result, this analysis will span both the full period mentioned above, as 
well as pre-, post- and the so-called financial crisis period of 2007-8. The main focus will be on 
the existence and size of return reversals in the short term (one day to one trading week) and 
the other key variables that may predict and influence extreme price changes. The rationale 
for looking specifically at short term reversals is to fill a gap in theory surrounding this 
phenomenon in South Africa, since all prior South African research2 has been limited to long 
term overreaction. The theoretical benefits of investigating reversals in the short term rather 
than over a longer period are that issues such as time-varying risk premiums are seldom of 
any significance in the short term, and survivorship bias is also likely to be less relevant 
(Bowman & Iverson, 1998). This analysis will make use of total returns, and will be performed 
primarily for the South African stocks that constituted the largest hundred shares by market 
capitalisation at six-monthly intervals across the period of investigation. Smaller stocks were 
intentionally excluded from this study due to the potential biases introduced by their 
generally low levels of low liquidity, and the lack of really satisfactory methods of addressing 
this problem. In addition, as the asset management industry is most concerned with the 
larger capitalisation stocks, this limitation should not be very detrimental to the practical 
value of this research. The study will have applications in terms of testing for market 
efficiency if the results are used for further study, but the core objective is to investigate 
overreaction and perform a comparative study of large increases and decreases to check for 
similarities and differences in characteristics as well as test the performance of portfolios 




                                                          
2 See, for example, Page and Way (1993), Okeahalam and Jeffries (1999), Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003), Hsieh 
and Hodnett (2011), and Frisch et al (2014).  
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1.2 Research Contribution 
 
As per my knowledge, this is original research within the South African national context, with 
a short term return window of up to one trading week as the focal point. In contrast to prior 
South African studies, which generally considered shares that significantly under– or 
outperformed on a relative basis, this research investigates short term overreaction in the 
context of large one-day share price movements (specifically in excess of ±5% and ±10%), as 
well as trading strategies based on these absolute price movements. Although there are 
other share price reversal studies that focus on the local market (mostly using pre-2010 
data), such as the studies of Okeahalam and Jeffries (1999), Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003), 
Jefferis and Smith (2005), Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) and Itaka (2015), these tend to explore 
different aspects and longer horizons compared to this study.  
 
With the exception of the last two studies, most of these studies therefore do not cover the 
financial crisis period of 2007-8, or indeed subsequent events. The most recent study on the 
overreaction phenomenon in South Africa is that of Itaka (2015), which focused on short 
term and long-term overreaction, but used monthly returns as opposed to the daily returns 
used in this dissertation. An additional difference is the absence of an absolute returns cut-
off as basis for the prior study, but which is a key factor in sample selection in this 
dissertation. This latter approach is thematically similar to the work of Frisch et al (2014), 
which focused on long term overreaction over one month periods.. The findings from this 
dissertation may be applied in practice to tactical asset allocation or market timing strategies 
with a contrarian view, which is the main practical application of the results related to return 
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1.3 Research questions  
 
The main research questions of this study are as follows: 
 
(i) Do short term overreaction and share return reversals exist in the South African 
equity market? Is this effect consistent within the overall and sub periods?  
 
(ii) If reversals exist, do they occur within a day and persist for a trading week?  
 
(iii) Is there any difference in this effect before, during and after the Global Financial 
Crisis? If so, is there an exaggeration or a dampening of this effect?  
 
(iv) Is there a difference between reversals for the stocks that have positive price shocks 
and those that have negative shocks? 
 
(v) What variables have consistent explanatory power in the stock overreaction 
models? 
 
(vi) Are there opportunities to trade on these findings and earn abnormal returns when 
compared with the market?  
  
1.4 Structure of the Study 
 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 provides a theoretical 
overview and a literature review of relevant research on the Overreaction Hypothesis in 
developing and developed countries, and discusses other anomalies which may confound the 
results associated with overreaction. This chapter also highlights some additional factors to 
consider when investigating stock price overreaction. Chapter 3 focuses on the sources of 
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data, the timeframe for which the sample is required, screening criteria, and the justification 
for the choice of return measure used. This leads into Chapter 4 (Methodology) which 
discusses the hypothesis development and provides the model specifications and an outline 
of the statistical procedures used.  
 
The results and analysis chapter (Chapter 5) provides the quantitative output and qualitative 
discussion of the statistical results relating to short term overreaction. Empirical answers to 
the research hypotheses are provided and are analysed in line with the existing theory and 
possible insights offered by this study. In order to test the practical and economic 
significance of this studies’ findings for return reversals, a portfolio allocation exercise was 
performed as discussed in Chapter 6, in order to provide a comparative measure by testing 
the performance relative to a market benchmark. The limitations of the study and its results 
along with suggestions for further study follow in Chapter 7. The final chapter (Chapter 8) is a 
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Chapter 2: Literature Study 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will provide the theoretical foundation and empirical basis for the investigation. 
The first section provides a summary of the main theories that are relevant to the central 
topic of research, namely the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) and the concept of share 
price overreaction. This is followed by an explanation of relevant effects (the January and 
value and size effects) which have been presented as possible contributors to observed share 
price overreaction in previous studies. Other significant factors which possibly contribute to 
share price overreaction, such as transaction costs and time varying risk premiums, are also 
discussed. The final sections focus on prior research conducted on share price overreaction 
and price reversal over the short term internationally, and over the long and short term in 
South Africa specifically. Some of the key findings of different, yet related, work is presented, 
including separate sections on the empirical tests for short term overreaction that were 
used, as well as general returns modelling in South Africa. A summary of the key themes 
concludes this chapter.  
   
2.2. Theoretical Overview  
 
This section expands on some background theory to contextualise the work in this research 
project. Share price overreaction and the Efficient Market Hypothesis are linked concepts, as 
the existence of the former directly challenges the latter. The Uncertain Information 
Hypothesis suggests an altered model for resulting price movements inconsistent with the 
Overreaction Hypothesis. Behavioural Finance provides explanations for share price 
overreaction in terms of psychological biases.  
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2.2.1 The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that a market in which all publicly available and 
private information is reflected in the market prices of assets is efficient. There are three 
forms of efficiency. In order of increasing strictness, these are the weak, semi-strong and 
strong forms of market efficiency (Fama, 1970). The weak form version of the EMH asserts 
that the current market prices will capture and reflect all historical publicly available price 
data, and hence it also implies that a market participant cannot outperform the market on 
the basis of past data using technical analysis (Rhode & Strumpf, 2004). The semi-strong 
version additionally assumes that all other forms of past information are also accounted for in 
current prices (Rhode & Strumpf, 2004). Hence, this is a stricter form of market efficiency and 
implies that neither technical nor fundamental analysis have scope to provide superior 
returns. The final and strictest version of market efficiency is the strong form, which is based 
on the asset prices reflecting all privately held and publicly available information, and hence it 
is not possible to outperform the market using this information (Rhode & Strumpf, 2004). 
Various tests have been devised to test whether equity markets are strong, semi-strong or 
weak form efficient. 
 
The key assumptions for the EMH, which are related to perfect markets, are summarised by 
Gilson and Kraakman (2003), as is described below. In practice, these are all debatable (or 
unrealistic) assumptions. 
 
 Perfect information is available in the market and it arrives randomly. 
 Investors are rational agents and act rationally when they respond to news. 
 No transaction costs are incurred when acting in the market.  
 
The basic implication of market efficiency is that past information is already accounted for in 
the present prices, and any changes are reflected swiftly by movement in share prices to 
account for them. The EMH implies that it is not possible to predict future prices, since the 
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price behaviour follows a random walk and as a result future price movements are 
unpredictable. Fundamentally, these implications stem from the combined notions of rational 
market behaviour and random variation in asset prices.  
 
Alternative pricing concepts that arise in relation to the efficient market hypothesis are 
arbitrage-free pricing and the law of one price. Arbitrage-free pricing holds that it is not 
possible to make risk free profits (arbitrage) by simultaneously trading assets to exploit 
mispricing, since markets would price these assets accurately (Rhode & Strumpf, 2004). The 
logic is that if prices reflect public information, then all investors have access to this 
information, and hence any mispricing would be instantly noticed and trading activity would 
adjust demand and price to the fair value. The law of one price is a similar idea, and states that 
prices for the same asset in different locations should be the same after trading and other costs 
have been taken into consideration. This therefore suggests that arbitrage opportunities are 
not available by sourcing similar securities from different locations (Mankiw, 2011).  
 
2.2.2 The Overreaction Hypothesis and Return reversals 
 
The earliest works documenting research on the Overreaction Hypothesis were studies by 
Beaver and Landsman (1981), Kahneman and Tversky (1982), and DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985), and it has since gained the reputation of possibly being an anomaly to the efficient 
market hypothesis (Ma, Tang & Hasan, 2005). When considering a short horizon for 
overreaction, biases in the reaction to unanticipated information are cited as explanations, 
whereas for longer term overreaction, waves of investor sentiment may cause the deviations 
in price (Otchere & Chan, 2003). In essence, this hypothesis implies that investors are unable 
to rationally update their expectations as suggested by Bayes’ rule. There has been a great 
deal of technological, institutional and transactional development in the financial markets 
since their work, which has greatly expanded the trading environment - however the 
fundamental behaviour of market participants is assumed similar and rational. Historically, 
research on the stock market overreaction hypothesis has directed researchers to two 
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significant implications. Firstly, if this phenomenon exists in the market, then it comes up 
against the conventionally theory of market efficiency, especially weak form efficiency (De 
Bondt & Thaler, 1985). Secondly, the magnitude of the subsequent price reversal appears to 
be directly linked to the size of the initial shift in price (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985). 
 
The Overreaction Hypothesis contradicts weak-form efficiency, and consequently also the 
semi-strong and strong form hypotheses, since they both build on the basic assumptions of 
weak form efficiency. A related area of interest is the persistence of this overreaction 
phenomenon and mean reverting price behaviour. Although direct tests of the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis are not a core objective of this research project, consideration of some of 
the evidence for the Efficient Market Hypothesis in South Africa is worthwhile. 
 
Okeahalam and Jeffries (1999) researched the speed at which company announcements are 
captured in the price of shares of JSE listed shares. Based on data that covered weekly 
performance, their findings supported that theory that the market displayed the semi-strong 
version of efficiency over the period tested. Appiah-Kusi and Menyah (2003) similarly used 
weekly returns based on an index and found that the JSE was not weak-form market 
efficient, which contradicts the findings of Okeahalam and Jeffries (1999). This result was 
then debated when Jeffriis and Smith (2005) found that returns on the JSE followed a 
random walk which in turn implied that there was weak-form efficiency. The findings from a 
later study of the JSE by Smith (2008) further supported this result. Overall the evidence 
remains mixed on market efficiency as seen from the differences in the studies mentioned 
here 
 
2.2.3 The Uncertain Information Hypothesis 
 
The uncertain information hypothesis (UIH) asserts that the abnormal returns following both 
positive and negative price movements or events should remain positive for some time 
(Ketcher & Jordan, 1994), and was first investigated by Brown et al (1988). Hence, there is a 
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similarity in the predictions of overreaction and the UIH for negative price shocks, as they both 
anticipate positive abnormal returns. The reasoning derived from the UIH is that price shocks 
(regardless of whether positive or negative) lead to changes in estimates of systematic risk, 
causing an increase in expected returns after the price shock. To differentiate between the two 
hypotheses requires considering both positive and negative shocks, for which the overreaction 
hypothesis posits reversals, whereas the UIH predicts positive abnormal returns for either 
shock.  
 
2.2.4 Behavioural Finance  
 
Behavioural finance may offer some insights into the patterns or behavioural biases that would 
explain the deviation from expected prices that occur due to over- and under reaction. There is 
an emphasis on psychological and cognitive principles which are outside the scope of this 
research, but are still material in understanding this phenomenon. Basically, if biases exist and 
are consistent, this would imply that individuals systematically alter their decisions based on 
these, and consequently affect stock prices through their trading activity. This section seeks to 
briefly cover some research into theories and models that have been developed in behavioural 
finance to explain overreaction.  
 
The representative heuristic (representativeness) is defined as a tendency which causes 
individuals to take an instance or event as representative of the probability of a specific thing in 
general. In the context of stock overreaction, this implies that investors observe good or bad 
news related to a stock, and then alter their view of, and dealings in, the stock. Based on how 
they incorporate this representation, investors may act in ways that feeds into overreaction 
due to the bias introduced. As found in the investigation by Kahneman and Tsversky (1982), 
there are predictable and systematic errors due to this heuristic when subjects evaluate 
uncertain events.  
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A related concept is uncertainty avoidance, which is the degree to which a society or culture 
can deal comfortably with ambiguity and uncertainty, and the extent of this leads some to feel 
more pressed for action than others (Hofstede, 2001). It was concluded by Cyert and March 
(1963) that members in cultures with high avoidance focus on short term responses, and try to 
resolve immediate issues rather than plan and develop long run strategies. Based on this 
myopic tendency, such investors react in a way that would move share prices specifically in the 
short run after negative or positive news, thus giving rise to overreaction price patterns.         
 
Investor overconfidence was investigated by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), 
who held that investors are overconfident about the information they have, and by self-
attribution bias this overconfidence increases with confirmatory news, and consequently drives 
the observed overreaction. Hong and Stein (1999) posited a model which incorporated initial 
underreaction, followed by overreaction, which causes a stock price reversal in the future. 
Included in this model are two types of participants, namely momentum traders and news 
watchers. They are distinguished based on the type of information they exclusively use: news 
watchers favour private information, and momentum traders solely use information of past 
price changes (Hong & Stein, 1999). 
 
According to this model, the implied sequence of events is that initial price changes are caused 
by the actions of news watchers, which are then followed by momentum traders, who observe 
these initial changes. According to Hong and Stein (1999), the potential outcome of this would 
be initial under-reaction based on trading by the news watchers, and then subsequent 
overreaction when the momentum traders act, with prices returning to fundamental value in 
the long run. A possible explanation for profits from trading on overreaction is market 
inefficiency, but Locke and Gupta (2009) have noted that it is debatable whether investor 
activity is due to anomalies or rational behaviour.  
 
Further research in these behavioural aspects in addition to quantitative empirical 
investigations may provide a more complete understanding of the drivers behind observed 
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overreaction. The next section discusses some theory and evidence around effects that have 
explained observed overreaction in the past.   
 
2.3 Anomalies, Style Based Effects and other explanations of observed 
Overreaction  
 
Market anomalies are deviations of observable characteristics which are inconsistent with 
conventional theory. The term itself in this context originated from Kuhn (1970). Anomalies are 
relative to some assumed equilibrium model within an efficient market such as the CAPM 
model, so although they suggest inefficiencies they are not direct evidence that the market is 
inefficient.  
 
Style based effects cover some of the main anomalies in this section, and are categorised by 
Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) into measures of value, future earnings growth, and of 
irrationality and regret. Consideration of the full inventory of effects is beyond the scope of this 
study, and hence the analysis is restricted to the January, firm value and size effects. Note that 
bid ask bounce, which is also discussed below, is not a member of the style based classification.   
 
Some of these discrepancies may be due to market inefficiencies, gaps in empirical models or 
irrational behaviour that produces unconventional outcomes. If such anomalies are persistent, 
best practice would require their integration into market analyses to allow for more informed 
investment decisions. The following subsections explain some of the most common market 
anomalies, style based effects and other empirical explanations that may account for observed 
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2.3.1 The Effect of Bid Ask Bounce 
 
According to this concept, a share price reversal can be caused by a shift or ‘bounce’ in the bid-
ask spread (Cox and Peterson, 1994). The bid and ask prices are market determined and not 
pegged to mirror exact movements in each other. A scenario to illustrate this would be as 
follows: assume bad news related to a stock comes to the market, causing some individuals to 
sell the stock and others to not buy the stock - hence the bid price begins to decrease and the 
ask price to increase. Trading on the following day will probably occur at prices in between the 
previous day’s bid and ask range, and these shifts may appear to be overreaction and/or 
reversal effects. The widening and movement of the bid-ask spread in the direction of the 
reversal is a possible explanation for what may appear to be stock overreaction, or may at least 
explain some portion of this phenomenon. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) found that a bid-
ask bounce and returns are negatively serially correlated, which means that increases in the 
bounce would reduce returns and a reduced bounce would increase potential returns.  
 
Another line of reasoning is that if firms are smaller and are traded less (i.e. are less liquid), this 
would be reflected in a relatively larger bid-ask spread, which in turn would affect trading 
returns. This may feed into perceived overreaction, as there would be spurious correlation 
between the observed factors and the stock price reversal, since it accumulates the upward 
biases with the returns and exaggerates the observed mean reversion in share prices (DeBondt 
and Thaler, 1985). A suggestion to mitigate this issue is to use the buy and hold return instead 
of the cumulative abnormal returns that were used in studies such as that of DeBondt and 
Thaler (1985) as a measure of performance. Loughram and Ritter (1996) questioned the above 
results of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and of Conrad and Kaul (1993) with respect to their 
propositions based on the bid ask bounce. Their challenge to DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) 
methodology is that there was no significant difference if either buy-and-hold returns or 
cumulative abnormal returns were used as return measures. When comparing Conrad and Kaul 
(1993) with DeBondt and Thaler (1985), they attributed their different results for cumulative 
abnormal returns to survivorship bias in the sample.  
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2.3.2 January/Turn of the Year Effect and Tax 
 
Capital gains tax is due on the profits from the sale of shares which have increased in value, 
hence there is a benefit in deferring the sale of these until the nominal tax is minimised. The 
beginning and end of the tax year is significant in this regard as it determines a date of sale 
which would reduce taxes (all else equal) given that the tax assessment considers income in the 
tax year. The USA, for example, has a tax year that ends in December and abnormal returns 
that arise around December/January may be attributed to this tax benefit.  
This anomaly was first documented by Keim (1983) and Reinganum (1983), who found that a 
significant portion of observed abnormal returns for small firms actually were realised during 
the initial half of January in their study. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) also noted this calendar 
effect in their seminal work on share price overreaction.  A subsequent study by these authors 
found a negative relationship between excess returns in January and December for gainers, but 
no relationship for losers (DeBondt & Thaler 1987).  
 
Pettengill and Jordan (1990) found that the set of return reversals that could be attributed to 
the Overreaction Hypothesis, were in fact limited to being observed solely in January. Similarly, 
using a size matching methodology, in which gainer and loser portfolios were matched with 
similar portfolios that consisted of companies with comparable sizes, Zarowin (1990) showed in 
this case performance differentials were also limited to January only.  
 
Conrad and Kaul (1993) found similar results when they employed a buy and hold trading 
strategy, in particular that when focusing on the observed abnormal returns in January alone, 
these could not be attributed to the past performance of the securities and was in fact due to 
January effect. Conrad and Kaul (1993) furthermore challenged the overreaction documented 
by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) in their seminal work on the topic, on the basis of using 
December as the month for portfolio formation, as this was not consistent with the findings of 
the latter’s study when June or August were used instead.  
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Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) point out that in South African case, these calendar effects are less 
pronounced due to two reasons: in contrast to many international jurisdictions, in South Africa 
companies have a choice in their tax reporting month, and the fact that most shares are held by 
institutional portfolios rather than individuals. The former implies that there should be no 
discernible tax lock-in effect limited to January or any other specific month.   
 
2.3.3 The Company Value Effect 
 
Value in this context refers to the ratio of a fundamental metric to a market proxy (for instance, 
book-to-market or earnings-to-price) that measures a similar attribute. The value effect, which 
is also termed the Book-to-Market anomaly, refers to the observation that low market value 
stocks (higher book-to-market) are documented to perform better than those with higher 
market value, and earn positive abnormal returns. This effect is commonly tested to explain 
share price overreaction or deviations of empirical returns from the CAPM model, as noted in 
the studies below.  
 
Basu (1977) tested the theory that this effect was an explanation for empirical deviations from 
the CAPM. His results showed a statistically significant positive relation between earnings-to-
price and unexplained returns for stocks in the US market. This result was further observed by 
Basu (1983) and Keim (1983). Fama and French (1992) found similar evidence over a longer 
period (early 1960s to 1990) in the US market and strong evidence in international markets in 
their 1998 study. The value effect was particulary notable during the turn of the century when 
prices were adjusting after the Dot Com crisis.  
 
The value effect in South Africa has been documented by Mutooni and Muller (2007) over the 
period from 1986 to 2006, where value shares generally outperformed growth shares. Although 
Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) could not unearth a significant value effect in their study of 
the JSE, when Auret and Sinclaire (2006) added book-to-market to their size and P/E model, its 
effect subsumed the effect of size and P/E. Hoffman (2012) found evidence of the book-to-
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market anomaly in addition to the momentum and size effects. Lastly, Hodnett, Hsieh and Van 
Rensburg (2012) determined that shares with higher fundamental values relative to price, 
provide consistently higher payoffs.  
 
A theory used to explain this anomaly is that low value stocks have more potential growth 
available, and this opportunity results in higher realised returns in the future. An alternative 
explanation is that these low book-to-market stocks perform better due to a risk 
commensurate compensation (Mutooni & Miller, 2007). Lower book-to-market may be firms 
with volatile or weak financial performance and higher returns would be required to account 
for this added risk.  
 
2.3.4 The Size Effect 
 
The size effect is characterised by smaller firms’ stocks having better performance over time, as 
compared to larger capitalisation firms. There seems to be a link between the size of a firm and 
how much information is available and disseminated, in part due to larger firms having more 
research coverage. The following studies report on empirical results when testing for the size 
effect as an explanation for observed overreaction.  
 
Chopra et al (1992) found that after controlling for firm size, overreaction was greater for 
smaller companies relative to larger companies. This may be due to a larger share of individuals 
as opposed to institutions investing in these smaller shares, and individuals are more likely to 
overreact than a group of investors (Chopra et al, 1992). DeBondt and Thaler (1987) revisited 
their previous work to analyse the findings after accounting for, among others, the size effect. 
These authors reported that when ranked by market value the average of the high performing 
quintiles was substantially larger (up to thirty times) than that of the smallest quintiles, hence 
contradicting the idea of the size effect explaining the overreaction.  
 
20 | P a g e  
 
A contrasting result to that of the methodology of Zarowin (section 2.2.2), was put forward by 
Albert and Henderson (1995). This study showed that there was a bias in ranks in the size 
matching attempt, and when a different approach was used there was a clear distinction 
between the size effect and price overreaction.   
 
2.3.5 Transaction Costs 
 
Atkins and Dyl (1990) criticised past research on the Overreaction Hypothesis as not accounting 
for transaction costs when looking at available trading strategies. These authors did not find 
contradictory evidence regarding overreaction itself, but rather did not find economic benefits 
from trading on this phenomenon. Based on daily returns, these authors found weak support 
for an overreaction to positive news, but strong evidence for overreaction to unfavourable 
information. The implication was that transaction costs (using the bid ask spread as proxy) 
eliminate potential profits from reversals, and hence the conclusion was that the efficient 
market hypothesis holds for the overreaction hypothesis as well.  A later study by Akhigbe et al 
(1998) challenged the use of the bid-ask spread for transaction costs as being an incomplete 
measure of the latter. Using daily closing bid-ask spreads, Akhigbe et al (1998) found similar 
results, which supported the simultaneous existence of the EMH and the Overreaction 
Hypothesis, and that except for the most extreme ‘losers’, there were no excess profits made 
through trading.   
 
2.3.6 Time Varying Risk Premiums 
 
An implicit assumption of some of the prior research linked to the Overreaction Hypothesis is 
that there is no change in asset risk over the testing period. This may be unrealistic, especially if 
the stock has undergone an extreme price change in one day. The Theory of Time Varying 
Rational Expectation is relevant in this regard.  If perceived changes in risk are priced into the 
asset value via their beta, then this may explain some or all of the excess returns realised by 
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trading, since higher risk would require a higher return in the market, as argued by Chan (1988), 
as well as Ball and Kothari (1989).  
 
Jegadeesh (1990), on the other hand, finds that any assumed premium due to time varying risk 
could not explain the profitability of trading based on contrarian views.  Similarly, Dissanaike 
(1997) found no evidence that time varying risk was significant in explaining excess returns, in 
spite of using two different measures: estimating risk relative to the log version of the CAPM 
model3 and CAPM-adjusted returns4.  The mixed evidence when contrasting the empirical 
evidence suggests that further examination of the standard CAPM model is required, and also 
questions whether beta is a sufficient risk measure on its own.  
 
2.4 International Prior Research on Short Term Share Price Reversal / 
Overreaction 
 
This section summarises the international empirical evidence related to short term share price 
overreaction, while the methodologies used in these studies are elaborated on in Section 2.6.   
 
2.4.1 Evidence from Germany 
 
Lobe and Rieks (2011) searched for evidence of short term overreaction on the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange for the 20 year period 1988 to 2007. These researchers used 10% as the cut-
off for share price changes (to classify them as abnormal returns), and found significant 
evidence of short term overreaction, which was not limited to small cap securities. In 
addition, the possible contribution of anomalies to the overreaction was tested for, but only 
the size effect seemed relevant. When the latter was controlled for, reversals could mostly 
explain the overreaction to price shocks. However, because of transaction costs and random 
investor sentiment, the above authors believe that these anomalies cannot be used 
                                                          
3 Model: 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑝𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑙𝑛𝑟𝑓𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 




𝑝(𝑇)(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝑒𝑝𝑡(𝑇), 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑇 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟. 
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consistently as a market-beating strategy. Furthermore, return reversals after sharp price 
changes did not diminish over time, which implies that neither limited liquidity nor a bid-ask 
bounce can fully explain this phenomenon. In addition, it was found that abnormal returns 
after negative shocks were greater than those after positive shocks. Overall though, the 
above researchers did not find conclusive evidence that the efficient market hypothesis was 
violated, despite of their evidence for short term overreaction.  
 
2.4.2 Evidence from Hong Kong 
 
Otchere and Chan (2003) investigated both short term overreaction and tested a contrarian 
trading strategy in the sub-periods before and after the Asian Financial Crisis, covering the 
period March 1996 to June 1998.  It was found that the overreaction was more notable for 
the stocks which had large positive shifts in price compared to the stocks that had a large 
drop in price. In addition, although evidence of overreaction was found, once transaction 
costs were adjusted for, there were no excess returns available and hence weak form 
efficiency appears to hold in the Hong Kong equities market.  Consideration was also given as 
to whether the company size, bid ask bounce and day-of-week effects had something to do 
with the overreaction. No significant relationship for company size was found, but a small 
positive correlation between bid-ask spreads and reversals of gainers was found, and also 
that calendar effects such as the day-of-the-week effect only explained a trivial portion of 
the differences in abnormal returns (Otchere & Chan, 2003).  
 
The methodology involved models that benchmarked abnormal returns - the capital pricing 
model (CAPM), mean adjusted model and the market model of returns. Significant return 
reversals were determined to occur at 2.1 days for the gainers, whereas significant return 
reversals for the losers occur after 2 days. When comparing results for the pre-crisis and 
intra-crisis periods, overreaction appeared to be more pronounced in the pre-crisis period, 
which suggests that market efficiency was more stable during the Asian financial crisis, 
contrary to what may be expected in periods of financial distress. In contrast to other studies 
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on short term reversal (conducted in the USA), such as Atkins & Dyl (1990) and Cox & 
Peterson (1994), which found reversals occurred in one day, the time for reversals took 
about 2 days for gainers and losers in this study, which may be due to a possible lesser 
extent of informational efficiency in the Hong Kong stock exchange (Otchere & Chan, 2003). 
The authors cite cultural differences in risk and return as a possible explanation to 
differences in the time and magnitude of reversals compared to other studies, which was 
also documented by Ji et al (2001).  
 
2.4.3 Evidence from India 
 
The short term price behaviour of selected Indian stock indices was investigated by Maher & 
Parikh (2011), to determine whether the driver was short term overreaction, uncertainty 
avoidance, or anticipation. It is useful to note that analyses were conducted on both the 
before- and after crisis periods, and that results differed depending on which of these 
periods the data originated from. A GJR-GARCH specification and a model that used mean 
adjusted returns of cumulative abnormal returns was employed, and under- reaction in small 
and midcap stocks in periods other than post crises was found, as well as slight evidence of 
overreaction before the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
Choudhary and Sethi (2014) examined overreaction in the Indian equity market by 
investigating the Bombay Stock Exchange’s 1427 listed companies over the period 1990 to 
2012, while also focusing on size, seasonality and value effects. This study is more useful for 
its treatment of the size and value effect rather than solely the overreaction aspect, since the 
main focus is more on long term overreaction. Specifically, these authors utilised model 
specifications that controlled for the size and/or value of the companies, and this 
methodology informs some of the techniques that can be adapted for this study.  
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2.4.4 Evidence from Japan 
 
Bremer et al (1997) examined price overreactions on the Tokyo Stock Exchange using firms 
listed on the Nikkei 300 for the 10 year period January 1981 to December 1991. Although 
these authors only found substantial evidence for one side of overreaction (negative price 
shocks), there is still relevance to this study since it has been noted that the reversals may 
not be symmetrical5, and this makes the case for examining decreases and increases 
separately. Although the size and duration of these reversals created potential profits, the 
probability of earning excess returns based in this approach was again considered much 
reduced by transaction and other costs. The bid-ask effect was not considered in this analysis 
as the Tokyo Stock Exchange operates on a single price, and no special quotes are used to 
reduce the rate of price changes and also to limit large shifts in price. According to Bremer et 
al (1997), an interesting possible cultural distinction is that bigger players in the dealer 
market and members of the Tokyo Stock Exchange protect large customers by not taking 
advantage of opportunities one day and later.  
 
2.4.5 Evidence from New Zealand 
 
In contrast to some of the studies mentioned earlier, Bowman and Iverson (1998) researched 
short term overreaction on a weekly basis on the New Zealand stock exchange using event 
study methodology and a cumulative abnormal returns model. The cut off to select the 
sample of gainers and losers that these researchers used was a 10% price change over a 
week,. In this instance evidence of overreaction was found for shares that had experienced 
one-day price changes of 10% or more, which was more significant for the losers group 
(reversals of 2.4% within a week), than for  the gainers (reversals of -1.5% within a week).The 
magnitude of the reversal appeared to be proportionate to the initial price change. In order 
to determine the effect of penny stocks (share price <NZ$1.00) on the results, samples both 
with and without penny stocks were examined, but no significant differences in reversals 
                                                          
5 For instance Lobe and Rieks (2011) find very different coefficients for increases versus decreases.   
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were found between the two samples. Additional tests were also conducted to investigate 
the role of other effects that may have affected the results, including time period, risk 
estimates, seasonality, size and bid-ask spreads, as well as to ensure robustness and 
consistency.  
 
To check for internal consistency across time, the sample period was divided into three and 
the initial tests for overreaction was repeated for each period.  A statistically significant 
reversal effects was, however, found regardless of which sub period was tested. To analyse 
any possible impact of seasonality on share return reversals, the sample was retested using 
monthly periods, resulting in the finding that reversals were still consistently present on a 
monthly basis.  Furthermore, no significant association between company size or the bid-ask 
spread and share return reversals were found, thereby eliminating these anomalies as 
possible causes for the results. To test for the size effect, data on size was inaccessible hence 
share price was used as a proxy, based on correlation beliefs between the two measures. No 
statistically significance was found between company size (as proxied here) and reversals. 
Finally, considering bid-ask spread movements and their potential effect on reversals, 
similarly share price was again used as a proxy, based on an assumed negative correlation 
with bid-ask. No significant difference from their initial results was found by this test. 
 
2.4.6 Evidence from Pakistan  
 
Sohail and Javid (2014) investigated short term under and overreaction effect on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange amidst the Global Financial Crisis, over the period from September 2007 to 
September 2009. The results suggested an absence of significant evidence of under or 
overreaction effect both during and after the period of financial turmoil. The abnormal returns 
overall indicate some significant overreaction for non-financial sector shares in the first two 
weeks. Furthermore, the evidence showed that financial sector shares that experienced a 
positive price shock did not exhibit any significant overreaction, at least for one month 
following news of the crisis.  In general, all shares that experienced large price declines did not 
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significantly under or overreact. When looking at the gainer and the loser portfolios 
individually, neither showed any indication of either under or overreaction (Sohail & Javid, 
2014). This suggested the presence of dampened under and overreaction after the financial 
crisis which may be attributed to the momentum effect and limited international financial 
market linkages that averted the crisis contagion (Sohail & Javid, 2014). 
 
2.4.7 Evidence from Taiwan 
 
Huang (1998) investigated short term overreaction in the Taiwan Stock Exchange after 
changes in the price limits in the share market, using the 6657 trading day period from 1971 
to 1993 as the sample. An event study approach was used, by comparing cumulative 
abnormal returns as a proxy for reversals, and expected returns estimated by the market 
model. It was concluded that for both increases and decreases in the daily price limits, there 
were statistically significant reversals, with abnormal returns of -0.249% on day two for limit 
increases, and 0.35% on day two for limit decreases (Huang, 1998). These results remained 
statistically significant, even after adjustment for the impact of the size effect.   
 
2.4.8 Evidence from the USA 
 
A useful methodological point of interest is the use of the average of the bid-ask prices to 
calculate price returns, as used by Park (1995). The study found that for a short investment 
horizon, systematic abnormal return patterns following price shocks were observed, and these 
return reversals persisted even after systematic trading patterns had been adjusted for. 
However, trading strategies based on these short-run reversals indicated that consistent profits 
cannot be earned when accounting for transaction costs and the bid-ask difference.   
 
Lasfer et al (2003) analysed a global basket of share indices, ranging from the All Share index 
in the UK to the NYSE All Share index in the USA, for the period 1989 to 1998. This study 
found that large positive price movements precede notably large and positive abnormal 
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returns, and that large negative price movements precede negative abnormal returns. This is 
a similar result to that of a study by Cox and Peterson (1994), which examined share returns 
following large one-day price declines. These authors also discovered that effect of bid-ask 
bounce and the liquidity for buying and selling shares explained return reversals over a short 
horizon. On the other hand, Lasfer et al (2003) were unable to uncover evidence in support 
of overreaction, In addition, shares which experienced large one-day negative returns 
continued to have negative returns over an extended of time. Conrad et al (1994) provided 
evidence for a link between transaction frequency and subsequent auto-covariances in 
weekly returns such that highly actively traded shares would have return reversals (negative 
auto-covariances), while the returns of low activity shares did not.  
 
Ma et al (2005) investigated the overreaction hypothesis for the shares with the largest daily 
price movements (positive and negative) between January 1996 and December 1997. They 
selected shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, which were divided 
into groups of gainers and losers. Significant evidence supporting the overreaction 
hypothesis were found for both the NASDAQ gainer and loser groups. However, neither of 
the NYSE groups provided similar evidence. The reversals of share prices and their associated 
returns was found to occur within a 48 hour window after the initial price shift, and the 
regression analysis showed that the reversals were inversely proportional to the magnitude 
of the initial price shift after accounting for differences in company size. 
 
Simpson et al (2011) examined the nexus of individual stock return reversals and industry 
momentum. The results showed that individual stock return reversals tend to be related to 
return reversions within different industries. Thus, the predictions of the overreaction 
hypothesis held market-wide and within industries. This led to a different trading strategy than 
those suggested by either the overreaction hypothesis or by industry momentum. This modified 
strategy involved a long position on the losers from the industry that gained in the last month, 
and took a short position on the gainers from the industry that lost in the last month. This 
strategy was found to significantly outperform the other two strategies.  
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Kudryavtsey (2012) examined the intraday behaviour of share prices in terms of short-term 
reversals using the method employed by Becker et al. (2008) which used intraday upside and 
downside volatilities to measure reversals. For the sample, it was found that the average daily 
returns were higher after a day when a share’s upside volatility was equal to or greater than its 
downside volatility, than when the downside volatility was stronger. This was explained as a 
short term ‘reversals of reversals’.  
 
Da et al (2014) investigated the portion of short run reversals that were unexplained by news. 
The authors found that if analyst forecast revisions6 were u used as a proxy for news relating to 
cash flow, an adapted strategy based on reversals of this generated an excess return four times 
larger than the conventional price reversal strategy. Specifically separating and focusing on the 
portion of past returns (cash flow news) which excludes other fundamentals allows for a 
different analysis of short term reversals. Through this method, these authors found that both 
liquidity shocks and the behavioural aspects contributed to the overreaction and reversals- 
sentiment on the short side due to short sale restrictions which delay instantaneous 












                                                          
6 See Section 2.6.3.  
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2.5 Evidence from South Africa 
 
2.5.1 Prior Research on Overreaction 
 
The earliest exploration of stock price overreaction in South Africa was by Page and Way 
(1993), whose study covered 204 JSE-stocks over the 15 year period between July 1974 and 
June 1989. This is different from the other studies below since it was conducted exclusively 
in the market of the Apartheid era when the nation faced imposed sanctions and other 
market related limitations. Monthly data was used, which was justified based on perceived 
bias avoidance from nonsynchronous and infrequent trading, as well as the ‘bid-ask effect’ 
that was discussed in section 2.2.1.  
 
The screening process excluded companies which did not have at least 30 trading weeks of 
data in any given calendar year, which introduces a possible survivorship bias in the sample 
that was tested. To represent the market index an equally weighted portfolio of the 204 
shares was used, and the index return calculated as an arithmetic average return.  This 
portfolio composition method, instead of a value based approach, was used since it was 
feared that an upward pressure on portfolio returns would be introduced with time via the 
latter method.   
 
Page and Way (1993) specifically focused on stock price efficiency with respect to 
incorporating positive or negative earnings announcements. The emphasis was on long term 
reversals, using a smaller sample and a different trading environment. Page and Way (1993) 
found that there were inefficiencies at the weak form level, and that there was notable 
overreaction in the South Africa equities market. These authors further found that excess 
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Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) investigated overreaction and the timing of mean reversals from 
January 1993 to March 2009, using gainer and loser portfolios. Monthly returns based on the 
total return index of companies listed on the FTSE/JSE index were used in equally weighted 
portfolios to avoid mean-variance inefficiencies associated with cap weighted versions. The 
test metric was a cumulative average residual return over three years after portfolio 
formation, based on a momentum return variable. Using portfolio performance measures, 
correlation analysis and cumulative spreads, the authors found that losers exhibited stronger 
reversals than gainers. It was suggested that this difference was due to behavioural biases 
and that the magnitude of reversals was cyclical and fluctuated around the local business 
cycle. Two key observations were made that are relevant to this study - the majority of 
shares are held by institutional investors, and firms have complete discretion on the choice 
of their tax year end, which in effect greatly diminishes the possibility of the January effect.   
 
Frisch et al (2014) tested for under and overreaction in the South African share market by 
testing abnormal returns on the FTSE Group JSE Top 40 index after large price changes over 
monthly periods. During the sample period (January 2003 to December 2011), these authors 
noted that 68 different companies constituted the top 40, with the index’s membership 
established based on quarterly revisions. The rationale for limiting the sample to the largest 
40 companies was to exclude significant size and liquidity differences. Time varying risk was 
adjusted for and consistency was tested within subsamples, but by focusing on a select 
group, a large part of the market is still left untested. 
 
Frisch et al (2014) used changes of more than 20% in closing prices over a month to narrow 
the sample. This monthly return was calculated using total returns, and an ‘event’ month 
was defined as one which experienced a greater change than 20% in either direction. A total 
of 150 company specific events were identified over the testing period, of which 56 were 
price declines, and 94 price increases. The majority of events occurred before 2010, with 
56% occurring either in 2008 or 2009, which is significant given that this is the period during 
which the Global Financial Crisis may have affected South Africa.   
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The methodology used incorporated the cumulative abnormal returns measure and a GARCH 
(1, 1) specification to analyse a market and market adjusted model. The sample was divided 
into two sub-periods: January 2003 up to December 2007 (prior to the Financial crisis) and 
January 2008 up to December 2011 (including and after the crisis). Dividing the sample to 
compare prior to, during and after the crisis did not show a significant trend for large price 
increases, but provided a highlight for price decreases: the crisis period exhibited significant 
reversals. Frisch et al (2014) found that negative and positive price shocks are followed by 
positive average cumulative abnormal returns (ACARs). When comparing positive and negative 
price shocks, the ACATs were smaller for price declines. Furthermore, when an event cut-off of 
30% was used, the ACARs remained significant. Investigating risk changes with time showed 
that risk was higher in the second sub period, but reverted to previous levels within a two year 
window. However, Frisch et al (2014) remained sceptical as to whether these anomalies can be 
consistently used profitably, given liquidity concerns in the South African market relative to 
other markets.  
 
Itaka (2015) examined short and long-term overreaction over the period January 2002 to 
December 2009 in a Masters research project. The short horizon was in terms of months, which 
is much longer than the daily and weekly investigation in this current study. The analysis was 
based on the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a one-year holding period for either 
winner or loser portfolios. The study found no evidence of mean reversion for winner and loser 
portfolios that were formed based on prior returns of a year or less, but there was significant 
mean reversion based on two and three year returns. The former was consistent with short 
term momentum, whereas the latter provided support for long term reversals. The returns 
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2.5.2 South African Returns Modelling 
  
This section will discuss prior research that inform which variables are relevant in South Africa 
for incorporation into the empirical models to be used. Several studies have investigated 
hypothetical models to explain returns on the JSE. Much of the work has focused on style based 
effects, and testing Fama and French’s return models, including the extended three factor 
model. This collection of work aims to provide an adequate empirical basis as to the relevance 
of some variables in South Africa. Although there also exists extensive literature on 
macroeconomic models, these are not relevant to this study, whose focus is not on modelling 
returns broadly, but rather only large abnormal returns relative to the market. Macroeconomic 
models are excluded from this study as the top down analysis is not suitable for the scope of 
work and the answers that are sought here. 
 
Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) investigated the interaction of company size, price-to-
earnings and beta on returns in the JSE following on from their previous work that looked at 
style based effects. Incorporating a dual sorting procedure based on size, the authors found 
that small firms have a smaller beta and earn higher returns. A similar conclusion was obtained 
regarding low P/E firms, which is that they presented higher average returns and had a smaller 
beta. The effects of size and P/E were found to operate in isolation from each other. 
 
Basiewicz and Auret (2010) tested the explanatory power of the Fama and French three factor 
model on the JSE with respect to the company size and value effects. Using data that was 
grouped and arranged for time-series tests, the authors found evidence that the three factor 
model explains a significant amount of variation in returns, while yielding small pricing errors. 
When similar tests were performed on ungrouped data, the model’s ability to capture the value 
effect was maintained, and managed to capture the size effect to some extent. 
 
Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011) built on the study by Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003) 
through testing of the size and price-to-earnings effects as well as beta using a dataset from 
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1994 to 2007. The authors found similarly statistically significant and persistent size and P/E 
effects (independent), but contrary to the evidence of Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), 
there was no statistical significance found for beta when compensating for thin trading. The 
latter implies model misspecification, and that the CAPM model is inadequate in capturing 
returns in the JSE.   
 
Hoffman (2012) researched a collection7 of share return anomalies in the JSE, over the period 
1985 to 2010, using equal and value weighted portfolios. Of particular interest to this thesis are 
the results related to company size and the book-to-market ratio. Employing a method of cross-
sectional regression, significant evidence was obtained in support of the book-to-market, size 
and momentum effects after adjusting for risk. Limited support was also found for the earnings-
to-book effect and for newly issued shares.  
 
In a comprehensive study of several style based effects, Muller and Ward (2013) found slightly 
different evidence regarding the size effect while providing support for other influential 
variables. The portfolio of style based effects tested included financial ratio styles,8 market 
based styles,9 as well as behavioural styles10.  Of key interest were the conclusions related to 
liquidity and size; poor liquidity was associated with persistent excess returns, whereas size had 
no significant effect aside from ‘fledgling’ companies. Although limited evidence was found in 
support of the size effect, its complete absence is not certain given the evidence for very small 
companies found in this study.  
 
Collectively, these studies provide consensus on influential variables that should be included in 
the investigation of returns in South Africa. Variables that function as proxies for size and value 
(such as the P/E and BTM ratio of individual companies) will be included in the empirical 
models. 
                                                          
7 market capitalisation, book-to-market, momentum, net share issues, yield-to-book, accrual of operational assets 
and growth in total assets 
8 interest cover, net asset growth, return on capital and equity 
9 cash flow-to-price, dividend yield, earnings yield, industry, liquidity, price-to-NAV and size 
10 momentum  
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2.6. Empirical test used in Short Term Overreaction studies 
 
Analysis of prior research on short term share price overreaction shows that there are broadly 
three types of statistical procedures that have been used, namely multivariate regressions, 
event studies, and volatility and variance testing (serial covariances and GARCH models). It 
should be noted that these approaches can be used in combination, but the key decision factor 
is the research objective. The following subsections expand on the methodologies used in prior 
literature.       
 
2.6.1 Event Studies 
 
Event studies offer a simple process to test a hypothesis based on a t statistic. The models 
that are required vary depending on their explanatory power but cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) is the common dependent variable. This section will summarise the process 
of event studies and the key features of some event studies as applied to testing the Short 
Term Share Price Overreaction Hypothesis. The event study methodology involves the 
following sequence of steps. 
 
1. Collect time series data of the daily returns of a company's shares and the market. 
 
2. For each event day - this being a day where abnormal returns (those in excess of some 
cut-off in either direction e.g ±5 %) were observed - identify all the data points for the 
company share returns and the market returns on the same day. This will be used in 
the sample that will be tested for the specific estimation window. 
 
3. In order to estimate the intercept and slope coefficients which model the returns 
relationships, a statistical analysis using a multivariate regression based on the CAPM, 
market or other specified expected returns model is used.  
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4. Using the estimates from the previous step, expected returns are computed for all 
data points on the days which have been included in the estimation window. 
 
5. The abnormal returns are calculated by subtracting the estimates for expected returns 
from the actual returns. Other variants of abnormal returns are also calculated and 
used for further analysis, such as cumulative abnormal returns or average abnormal 
returns.  
 
6. A statistical test is implemented to determine if the abnormal returns are significantly 
different from zero, and the other metrics (for instance abnormal, cumulative 
abnormal, average abnormal or cumulative average abnormal returns) are also 
available. The Student’s two sided t-test is usually used. It can be stated as follows: 
 
Null Hypothesis                𝐻0: µ1 = µ2 
Alternative Hypothesis   𝐻1: µ1 ≠ µ2 
 
Reject the null hypothesis if: t statistic > critical value of t or (-)t < (-) critical value. 
 
The table below lists some of the prior short term share price overreaction studies that utilised 
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Table 2: Summary of Models used In Event Studies of Short Term Overreaction 
Author  Purpose Measure 
Bremer and Sweeney 
(1991) 
Examine two-day return reversals 
following on from 10 consecutive 
days of negative returns.  
 
Cumulative Excess Return 
Huang (1998) Investigate Short Term Overreaction 
in the Taiwan Stock Exchange to 
changes in daily price limits 
Abnormal returns and CAR* 
Market Model 
Bowman and Iverson 
(1998)  
Test bid ask bounce, risk, seasonality 
and size in connection to Short Term 
Overreaction in New Zealand 
CAR 
Otchere and Chan 
(2003) 
Test Short Term Overreaction in 
Hong Kong in wake of Asian financial 
crisis 
CAAR** 
Ma et al (2005)  Test Short Term Overreaction in the  
NYSE and NASDAQ 
CAR 2 day 
Market model 
* Cumulative abnormal return       ** Cumulative average abnormal return        
 
2.6.2 Volatility and Variance Testing 
 
In investigating short-term share price overreaction, one of the most common approaches is 
volatility testing, which includes tests of serial correlation and covariances, GARCH model 
specifications, and modified volatility measures. This section will expand on these methods in 
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Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) investigated whether observed return reversals were due to 
overreaction or bid-ask errors in price measurement. Variances and autocorrelations are tested 










)                                                                                                                          (2.1) 
Where: 
𝑅𝑡 is the return for day t, 
𝑅𝑡
𝑘 is the return over k periods 
 
The second method is to use bid-ask errors to test their effect on returns volatility, by means of 
two tests on a bid-ask error variable 𝑅𝐷𝑡. The first sub-test involves time independence testing 
by estimating the daily autocorrelations of 𝑅𝐷𝑡, and whether these are equal to -1/2. The 










)                   where k = 1,2,3 ….                                                                (2.2) 
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) employed a set of different tests in analysing short term reversals 
and the bid ask spread. Essentially, the overarching process involved testing the relationship 
between serial covariances and the bid-ask spread, but broadly three types of empirical tests 
were used. These involved estimation of serial covariances, comparing the quoted spread and 





                                                          
11 This measure of effective bid-ask spread: 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 = 2√−(1𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠)  
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Maher and Parikh (2011) investigated short term share price overreaction in India using three 
size conditioned market indices: the BSE 30 (Sensex), the BSE Midcap, and the BSE Smallcap. 
The authors used both an event study based on the average cumulative abnormal returns, but 
citing the limitations of this approach, the focus was also placed on a Glosten-Jagannathan-
Runkle GARCH model using dummy variables.    
 
Kudryavetsev (2013) went a step further in terms of the short term, and investigated intraday 
reversals of return reversals on the Dow Jones Industrial Index constituents using upside and 
downside volatility in response to positive and negative news. Three portfolios were formed for 
both of these volatility measures, namely previous day, average and median volatility. The 
measures used were: 
 
𝑈𝑝𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦:  𝑈𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑂𝐻,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 100 ∗ 𝑅𝐻𝐶,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 100                                                                (2.3) 
  
𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦: 𝑈𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑂𝐿,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 100 ∗ 𝑅𝐿𝐶,𝑖𝑡 ∗ 100                                                             (2.4) 
 
Where: 
𝑅𝑂𝐻,𝑖𝑡 is the open-to-high price difference 
𝑅𝑂𝐿,𝑖𝑡 is the open-to-low price difference 
𝑅𝐻𝐶,𝑖𝑡 is close-to-high price difference 
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The table below summarises the salient features of the studies that used volatility tests:  
 
Table 3: Summary of volatility tests of short Term overreaction and reversals 
Author  Topic of research Test 
Kaul and Nimalendran (1990) Return reversals due to bid ask 
error or overreaction 
Variance-Ratio Test 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) Short term reversals and the 
bid ask spread 
Serial Covariance Modelling 
Maher and Parikh (2011) Short term overreaction as a 




Kudryavetsev (2013) Intraday reversals of return 
reversals 
Intraday Volatility Modelling 
 
2.6.3 Multivariate Regressions 
 
Lobe and Rieks (2011) employed a multivariate regression to investigate short term share price 
overreaction on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2007, using a 10% cut-off for price 
increases or decreases. Essentially the method used was an extended and modified version of 
the three factor model. The models incorporated variables to test for one day (Equation 1) and 
five day reversals (Equation 2), as well as for the impact of the size, value and book-to-market 
effects. Equations 3 and 4 were used for sub samples with similar sized companies, and 
therefore the size variable was excluded. In addition, the authors used the dummy variable R 
(=15) in Equations 5 and 6 for each year which had more than 20 events. Methodologically the 
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The model specifications are as follows:  
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡             (2.5) 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡     (2.6) 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                  (2.7) 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑡 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                        (2.8)  
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐵′𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                         (2.9)               
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑡 +
𝐵′𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                             (2.10) 
 
Where:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 1 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛, 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 5 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛, 
𝐸𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑝𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡, 
𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 log 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖, 
𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 log 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖, 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 3 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖,   
𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 log 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖, 
𝑉𝑂𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠 3 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑖, 
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Cox and Peterson (1994) examined price behaviour following large one day price declines of 
AMEX, MASADAQ and NMS securities. To test for any differences in return reversals arising 
from the size effect or from being listed on a particular exchange (which influences liquidity as 
well) and for the existence of an overreaction effect, Equation 7 was used. The use of the size 
variable here is significant, in combination with the size effect documented in South Africa, in 
reinforcing the need to account for this in the model used in this thesis. Notably, this is a 
different model to that of Lobe and Rieks (2014), which is expected given the 20 year gap 
between the research.    
 




𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑟𝑜𝑝 𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖, 
𝐴𝑅𝑂𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖,  
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖, 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑥 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑑𝑎𝑦,  
𝐷𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑋,𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑋 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,  
𝐷𝑁𝑀𝑆,𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑁𝑀𝑆 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
Da et al (2014) utilised a novel approach in studying short term share return reversals in the US 
market. Analyst forecast revisions were used as a proxy to approximate the effect of cash flow 
news, which provided a means to separate the portion of returns not driven by the underlying 
fundamental variables.  This differs from the other studies in this section as it used the CAPM, 
the three factor Fama and French Model, and augmented five factor models on four groups 
based on portfolio strategies: standard, within industries, within industries using residuals, and 
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The models used are listed below: 
 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝑀𝐾𝑇 − 𝑟𝑓)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                (2.12) 
 




 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚  
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦  
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 
𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡  𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡   




This chapter provided the theoretical basis for this investigation and its methodology going 
forward. Section 2.2 provided a summary of the Overreaction, Efficient Market and 
Uncertain Information Hypotheses, as well as the role of behavioural finance in explaining 
share price overreaction. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that a market in 
which all publicly available information is reflected in the market prices of assets is efficient.  
If overreaction exists in the JSE, then it comes up against the conventional theory of market 
efficiency, especially weak form efficiency (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985). The uncertain 
information hypothesis (UIH) asserts that the abnormal returns following both positive and 
negative price movements should remain positive for some time (Ketcher & Jordan, 1994).  
 
Section 2.3 discussed several factors that could either cause or account for observed 
overreaction, and provided some empirical evidence on these factors. This included the bid-
ask bounce, January, value and size effects, as well as transaction costs and time varying risk 
premiums.  Bid ask bounce suggests that a share price reversal can be caused by a shift or 
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‘bounce’ in the bid-ask spread (Cox and Peterson, 1994). The January effect suggests a sell-
off in December to reduce profits and tax leading to a reversal in January. In contrast to the 
US, this is not a real issue in South Africa due to flexibility in choosing the individual tax year 
end. The value effect, which is also termed the Book-to-Market anomaly, refers to the 
observation that low market value stocks (higher book-to-market) are documented to 
perform better than those with higher market value, and earn positive abnormal returns. 
The size effect is characterised by smaller firms’ stocks having better performance over time, 
as compared to larger capitalisation firms. The transaction costs of a trade can erode profits 
and it can be argued that large bid ask spreads can significantly increase these. If perceived 
changes in risk over the time periods are priced into the asset value via their beta, then this 
may explain some or all of the excess returns from trading, as higher risk would require a 
higher return. 
 
Section 2.4 focused on prior research conducted over the short term internationally, 
highlighting the differing evidence gathered over different time periods and geographies.  
Section 2.5 presented evidence from work on overreaction and reversals in South Africa, and 
was followed by thematic studies on general returns modelling in South Africa.  Section 2.6 
discussed the common methodologies used in all the studies of short term overreaction, 
namely event studies, variance modelling and regressions. The following chapter will deal 
with the data and sampling approach used in this research project. 
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This chapter discusses the data used in this study in terms of selection, screening and 
demographics. Section 3.2 explains the sample selection and also includes consideration on two 
of the key practical issues which may influence the analysis, and how this study has attempted 
to address these challenges. Section 3.3 provides a summary of the main screening criteria that 
were used in sample selection to ensure an adequate and representative sample was refined as 
per the research needs. Section 3.4 discusses the data requirements and data sources relevant 
to this study. Section 3.5 provides an exploratory analysis of the sample and includes key 
descriptive statistics and demographics.  
3.2 Sample Selection 
 
The sample period is July 2000 to June 2015. This test period, which includes the Global 
Financial crisis, allows for a comparison of three periods- pre, during and post crisis. The length 
of this period is also in accordance with the requirements of the study as it is similar to the 
longer end of recent short term studies - for instance, Lobe and Rieks (2011) used 20 years, 
Choudhary and Sethi (2012) used 12 years and so on, which also allows for a more robust test 
of consistency across time.  
 
Liquidity is not uniform across shares, and this has some effects on their pricing and return 
characteristics, especially if they are thinly traded, as is the case for most of the smaller stocks 
listed on the JSE. Price movements may not follow a smooth path in response to demand and 
supply dynamics in the market. Furthermore, low liquidity shares may indicate other company 
attributes which are not explicitly modelled for in standard models. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, there may be consequences to the bid-ask spread, as well as an effect when 
combined with low priced stocks. To avoid these issues in this research project, the sample is 
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selected as the top 100 JSE-listed shares as measured by market capitalisation at each six 
month interval within the sample period. These shares generally are very liquid, especially 
compared to the larger number of smaller stocks.   
 
Survivorship bias is a sampling issue that may occur with studies that involve only using data 
related to companies that are visible at the time of data collection. In their study, which was 
the first exploration of stock price overreaction in South Africa, Page and Way (1993) excluded 
companies which did not have at least 30 trading weeks in any given calendar year, as they 
might otherwise possibly introduce this bias. When comparing the study of Conrad and Kaul 
(1993) with DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) seminal study, which both focused on long term 
overreaction using identical data, Loughram and Ritter (1996) attributed the differences in 
cumulative abnormal returns to survivorship bias. In this particular study, given that the sample 
comprises the top 100 companies by market capitalisation as selected at 6-monthly periods 
throughout the sample period and not only at its end, survivorship bias is not considered a 
problem. In addition to this, any company which was a member of this custom group of the top 
100 at any point were included in the sample to capture their potential contribution.   
 
3.3 Screening  
 
There were 372,817 observations in the raw sample. Broadly speaking the following were the 
main criteria implemented in the filtering of raw data prior to its selection, by screening all 
equities for inclusion and exclusion in the sample as follows: 
 
(i) Noting of consistent high gainers and losers with these being individually 
investigated as potential outliers. This led to the exclusion of 542 of the 
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(ii) Companies with less than 60 trading days of return history in a specific 6-month 
window were excluded for that window only, but included in subsequent 
windows. This was done in in order to exclude the volatility effects of new IPOs. 
This occurred for two of the companies for one period. This led to the exclusion 
of 245 observations.  
 
(iii) Identification of shares with 60 or more trading days of data missing within the 
entire period. This did not lead to any exclusions from the sample.  
 
(iv) Check for very low value shares, i.e. penny stocks that may exhibit large price 
changes relative to share price. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there 
may be consequences to the bid-ask spread, as well as an effect when 
combined with low priced stocks. This was consistent with the studies by Lobe 
and Rieks (2011)12 and Bremer and Sweeney (1991)12 which screened for 
shares with very low prices. In this study there was no exclusion based on this 
criteria, as none of the top 100 shares at any point over the sample period were 
at less than R 10 for more than half of its trading life.   
  
To summarise the outcomes of the screening criteria, the original sample of 372,817 daily 
return observations was reduced to 372,030 observations, which therefore represents the 






                                                          
12 Lobe and Rieks (2011) used 10 Euros, while Bremer and Sweeney (1991) used $10.   




Total returns data and other company specific data for the 125 JSE-listed companies that 
together constituted the largest 100 companies on the JSE at any particular 6-month interval over 
the study period, was collected. This study used daily total returns and daily total returns rolled 
over five days, calculated from the total return index values, to investigate stock overreaction. It 
is important to note that because total returns were used (as opposed to share price returns), 
the confounding effects of dividends on share price changes were implicitly accounted for. In 
other words, total returns automatically corrected for the price impact of shares trading ex-
dividend. The sample population consisted of all abnormal daily total returns greater than 5% 
and less than -5%, over the period July 2000 to June 2015.  Primarily Thomson Reuters 
Datastream International was used as a source of data, but other financial databases such as 
Bloomberg and McGregor Bureau of Financial Analysis were relied upon to fill any blanks in raw 
data. The following is a list of all the data that was required: 
 
 Daily total return index values for all companies in the sample, this being used to calculate 
returns and return volatilities from July 2000- June 2015. This was required for all companies 
that are amongst the top 100 by market capitalisation.  
 
 Company price-earnings ratios  
 
 Daily All Share Index (ALSI) total return index values for the period, to be used a market 
benchmark. 
 
 Daily South African Volatility Index (SAVI) values from 2007 to 2009. This is defined in Section 
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 Market values for all the companies (or, alternatively, the number of shares outstanding) 
which was used in conjunction with the price data to calculate company market 
capitalisations  
 
 Book values of equity (to be used to determine the book to market ratios of the individual 
shares.  
 
3.5 Sample Distribution and Descriptive Statistics 
 
The working sample used in the analytics process was further filtered down based on return 
cut-offs. These were -5%, 5%, -10% and 10% which yielded two test samples, one based on 
absolute daily share price movements of 5% and, the other based  on absolute daily 
movements of 10%. The former consisted of 9117 daily observations and the latter had 855 
observations. The following table summarises some information about these subsamples.  
 












5 and -5 9117 34.48 -39.54 0.73 2.45% 
10 and -10 855 34.48 -39.54 3.19 0.23% 
*This is the average incidence of these events over the period, calculated as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
  
 
The figure below depicts a comparison of the monthly absolute frequencies of excess returns 
(defined as daily total returns of >5% and <-5%) by month across the entire sample period. For 
all months except June, there are more excess increases than decreases. More extreme daily 
return events are observed in the second half of the year, with a notable increase in extreme 
daily returns (negative or positive) in the months October to December. From the observable 
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behaviour in the figure there seems to be no indication of a typical calendar effect, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that a discretionary tax month (as is the case in South Africa) 
would eliminate the January or similar effect. Figures 2 and 3 display the event frequencies for 
upward and downward events separately with a common observation that the first three 
months and last three months of the year have the highest event frequencies.   
 

































Upward v Downward Share Price Events
>5% <-5%
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Figure 2: Event Frequencies for Upward Events (2000-2015) 
 
 
Figure 3: Event Frequencies for Downward Events (2000-2015) 
 
 
Figure 4 below shows the distribution of events by month over the period July 2000 to June 
2015. High frequencies of abnormal return events are noted in the years 2000-2002 in the wake 
of the Dot-Com bubble. Extremely high frequencies are observed between 2008 and 2009 when 
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to investigate share price overreaction in times of financial turmoil, where investor behaviour 
and rationality are challenged.  
 
A consistent pattern is detectable in both Figures 3 and 4, which split the sample on the basis of 
upward and downward movements. The period mid-2000 to mid-2003 is moderately active 
with low frequencies until early 2008, with the exception of a spike in June 2006. Early 2008 
until mid-2009 exhibits large numbers of decreases and increases followed by low frequencies 
until mid2015. The decomposition of events into upward and downward profiles provides 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This chapter provided an overview of the data collection process. The sample period is July 
2000 to June 2015. The required data was sourced from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
International as well as Bloomberg and McGregor Bureau of Financial Analysis. The key issues 
of share liquidity and survivorship bias were considered, and measures were instituted to 
address these, including the selection of the top 100 shares based on market capitalisation. A 
summary was provided of the screening criteria that was used in refining the sample based on 
the outliers. This included how long the company had been listed and identification of penny 
shares which led to the exclusion of 787 observations out of 372,817 from the raw data. The 
final sample consisted of 9117 daily observations for the ±5% daily total return cut-off, and 855 
observations for ±10% daily total return cut-off. Some information regarding the test samples 
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Research on South African returns modelling is discussed in Section 2.5, which highlights 
empirical work on the influential variables that form part of the model specifications. This, 
combined with the empirical tests described in Section 2.6, informed the choice to use a 
multivariate regression to analyse the data. Section 4.2 provides the research hypotheses 
developed for empirical analysis along with their rationale. Section 4.3 explains the base and 
alternative model specifications and each of the variables included in the empirical analysis to 
generate the results that are analysed in Chapter 5. Section 4.4 covers the comprehensive 
range of regression suitability tests and results which validated the appropriateness of a 
multivariate regression as the analytical method. Finally, Section 4.5 summarises the chapter 
and condenses the highlights into a conclusion.     
 
4.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
Based on a combination of analysis of prior literature and exploratory data analysis, some areas 
of specific research have been developed as hypotheses for this research project. The research 
questions have been developed into testable hypotheses. This section will state the hypotheses 
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4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Short term share return reversals exist on the JSE 
 
Research Question 1: Is there overreaction and return reversals in the short term in the South 
African listed equity market? 
 
This is core and foremost research question in this thesis. Studies have been conducted that 
focus on medium to long term in South Africa, but not on the shorter time horizons (one day 
and one week) that are evaluated here. However, evidence for overreaction, even if over a 
longer term, provides a basis for testing over a shorter horizon. When investigating share price 
overreaction on the JSE using monthly abnormal returns, Page and Way (1993) found significant 
evidence in support of this phenomenon at the 1% level for the period July 1974 to June 1989. 
On the other hand, Frisch et al (2014) found that both large price increases and declines are 
likely to be followed by positive share returns when investigating a similar horizon which does 
not lend support to reversals, which lends support to the uncertain information hypothesis . To 
answer this research question, reversals are tested extensively using regression analysis.    
 
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Upward and downward share return reversals differ 
  
Research Question 2: Are there share price reversal differences between large share price 
increases, and large share price decreases? 
 
In the remainder of this thesis companies whose shares experienced large positive price shifts 
are referred to as ‘gainers’, while those that experienced the opposite are referred to as 
‘losers’. As seen in Figures 1, 3 and 4, based on visual inspection there are definitely differences 
over time in upward and downward large price movements. The separation of price 
movements based on their directionality is relatively common in studies of this nature, as seen 
in the work by Lobe and Rieks (2011) and Frisch et al (2014). They are not paired movements 
and will be assumed as independent for the alternative hypothesis when testing. In addition to 
providing an additional test of robustness by separating upward and downward movements, 
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this also explores the possibility of which directional trade, if any, is over time more profitable. 
Furthermore, if there are identical price adjustments in either case, this would lend support to 
the Uncertain Information Hypothesis.  
  
This will be tested by running separate regressions for price increases and decreases using all 
the model specifications across the period. A comparison of the coefficients in terms of their 
size and significance, as well as a two sample t-test, will provide insight on any important 
differences which may exist.  
 
4.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Short term share return reversals are altered in times of 
financial turmoil 
 
Research Question 3: Is share price overreaction on the JSE enhanced or diminished in times of 
financial turmoil? 
 
There may be different effects at work in periods of financial crisis. The viewpoint here is 
derived from the behavioural aspects of investor decision making. For instance, when 
considering Asian financial crisis (ten years prior to the recent financial crisis), offshore traders 
were buying and selling based on if the market was bullish or bearish. These investors mirrored 
the actions of similar traders at the expense of accounting for fundamental data. This was 
noted by Kim and Wei (2002), who found significant evidence of this “herding” behaviour in 
Korean during this crisis. On the other hand, in times of financial turmoil, investors who take a 
contrarian view will attempt to benefit from this herding mentality by buying and selling from 
these positive feedback traders. Furthermore, Kim and Wei (2002) concluded that these actions 
may have exaggerated the crisis beyond what was reasonably expected. When investigating the 
Hong Kong market during the same crisis, Otchere and Chan (2003) found that the extent of 
overreaction seemed to have been dampened during the crisis period, which could have been 
due to lower activity in noise trading.  
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Frisch et al (2014) found that the beta coefficients for both positive and negative price shocks 
increase notaby in the period after the financial crisis, which implied higher levels of systematic 
market risk in the JSE. The regressions will be performed for the entire periods as well as for the 
pre-, intra- and post financial crisis periods, to test for any differences in reversals and the 
impact of the other variables. In times of financial turmoil, if there is a behavioural driver for 
overreaction, this may manifest differently from more stable or optimistic periods. The extent 
of this can be proxied by examining reversals over the different periods, separated by the crisis. 
  
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4: An economically significant reversals trading strategy exists 
 
Research Question 4: Are there opportunities to trade on the JSE on these findings and earn 
excess returns when compared with the market? 
 
Building on from the results of the previous hypotheses, the next step will be to determine if 
there exists any practical value to these findings, at least in theory. This is a common area of 
analysis for the majority of studies on overreaction for all the different horizons. In fact, 
especially for longer term studies, direct comparison of the gainer and loser portfolio 
performance is itself a test for overreaction and reversals. Page and Way (1993) found that 
loser portfolios outperformed gainers by between 10% to 20% over three years on the JSE. 
Otchere and Chan (2003) found that a contrarian strategy of trading on historical price 
information in Hong Kong did not yield profits in excess of transaction costs. On the other hand, 
Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) concluded that a contrarian trading strategy may have been a ‘safe 
haven’ in the JSE during the financial crisis because of lower correlation with the market. 
However, Frisch et al (2014) remained sceptical of whether overreaction could offer a profitable 
opportunity with low risk due to liquidity issues providing limitations on this. In order to test 
this hypothesis, a portfolio allocation strategy is used to determine buy and sell transactions 
over one and five trading days to compare the performance with the All Share Index using 
historical data.  
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4.3 Regression Model Specifications  
 
The statistical procedure employed for the analytical process in this study was 
multivariate regression, which used abnormal returns as the dependent variable. There 
are two model specifications used to test the linear relationships over one trading day and 
one trading week. These regressions are performed for the overall period July 2000 to 
June 2015, as well as the periods July 2000 to June 2008, July 2008 to December 2009 and 
January 2010 to June 2015– the middle two being, respectively, the period following the 
bursting of the dot.com bubble, and the time of the Global Financial Crisis.   
 
4.3.1 Base Model  
 
The base and alternative model specifications that were used in this study are similar to those 
developed and used by Lobe and Rieks (2011) in their study of the short term share price 
overreaction in the German share market. Its suitability as a model to investigate short term 
overreaction is supported by recent South African returns research, which validate the variables 
for size, value and book-to-market13. The model, through the use of the aforementioned 
variables, is also suitable to simultaneously test the associated effects which have been 
debated as explanations for observed share price overreaction and reversal. The base 
regression model is as specified below: 
 




)𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5 (𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖,𝑡)) + 𝛽6 (𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑡))  




                                                          
13 See Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), Basiewicz and Auret (2010), Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011) and 
Hoffman (2012).  
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4.3.1.1 Return Measures (𝒀𝒊,[𝒕,𝒕+𝟏] 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑹𝒊,𝒕) 
 
The dependent variable 𝒀𝒊,[𝒕,𝒕+𝟏], which is the abnormal return, is calculated relative to an 
index reference value as follows: 
 
𝒀𝒊,[𝒕,𝒕+𝟏] = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡+1 − 𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼.𝑡+1                                                                                                    (4.2)                                                                                                                         
 
Where: 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (
𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
) − 1                                                                                                                   (4.3)                                                                                                                                 
𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡,
𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑎 1 𝑑𝑎𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑖𝑡−1 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖  
 
𝑅𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼.𝑡+1 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 1 𝑑𝑎𝑦 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐽𝑆𝐸 𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the previous period’s return, which is used as a base on which to test for a one day 
or one week reversal.  
 
4.3.1.2 Average Return (𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕) 
 
Standard returns modelling is based on a stochastic model of mean and volatility. 
Normally distributed returns are assumed to vary about the mean within a band based on 
the standard deviation (volatility) of the sample. The inclusion of this variable allows a test 








                                                                                                                          (4.4)                                   
 
 
63 | P a g e  
 
4.3.1.3 Return Volatility(𝑽𝒊,𝒕) and the Volatility Index (𝑺𝑨𝑽𝑰𝒕) 
 
The share’s return volatility is included (in line with the work of Lobe and Rieks, 2011) as 
an explanatory variable due to the possibility that at times when its volatility is high, there 
could be incidences of high returns. This variable is calculated using the sample standard 
deviation based on three trading months (60 trading days) of share returns before an 








𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡)                                                                                                              (4.5) 
 
In addition to this, the market volatility index (the South African Volatility Index or SAVI) 
will be used as a separate explanatory variable to compare which volatility measure is 
more indicative for abnormal returns during the period 2008 to 2009. The SAVI is not 
available for the entire period, hence this comparison will only be made for the period of 
the financial crisis as it measures the market risk conditions during that time. The SAVI 
Top 40 is the specific index used here, and is an estimate modelled on the VIX. Similar 
to(𝑽𝒊,𝒕) it also uses a three month horizon, with the main difference being that the SAVI 
is forward looking and is obtained from the implied daily volatilities of the top 40 options 
in the market rather than using individual share’s historical return volatilities. 
 





The early work of Basu (1977) investigated and found empirical support for the idea that 
portfolios with low P/E ratios could provide greater abnormal returns than otherwise similar 
portfolios with higher P/Eratios. However, once adjustments for transaction costs and taxes 
were made, these higher returns were greatly diminished. A study by Banz and Breen (1986) 
found no such effect after adjusting for the survivorship and look ahead biases, but this was 
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later contradicted by a response paper from Jaffe, Keirn and Westerfield (1989), which used a 
longer period and found a P/E effect that was in fact more pronounced than the size effect. 
 
Considering South African work on the topic, Page (1996) found a similar result to Jaffe, Keirn 
and Westerfield (1989), and observed a P/E effect that is stronger than the size effect. 
Additionally, Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), as well as Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger 
(2011), found empirical support on the JSE for the hypothesis that low P/E companies offer 
abnormal returns.  
 
The historical trailing one month price earnings ratio was used in this study for each day. This 
was a key consideration to avoid issues of look ahead bias given a key aim of this study was to 
back test trading strategies over the 15 year period. This measure ensures that there is no 
assumption of information which investors would not have had on each day.  
 
4.3.1.5 Company Size as proxied by Market Value (𝑳𝑶𝑮(𝑴𝑽𝒊,𝒕)) 
 
The inclusion of this variable is supported by Section 2.2.4, which documented the size effect in 
international work as well as Section 3.6, through the body of work of Van Rensburg and 
Robertson (2003), Basiewicz and Auret (2010), Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011), and 
Hoffman (2012). Muller and Ward (2013), however, do not find evidence of the size effect, 
except for ‘fledgling’ companies. This variable is estimated by the log values of the companies’ 
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4.3.1.6 Book-to-Market Value (𝑳𝑶𝑮(𝑩𝑻𝑴𝒊,𝒕)) 
 
As mentioned previously, prior research has provided positive evidence of the influence of the 
book-to-market ratio (through the value effect) on abnormal returns, both internationally and 
in the South African market. Recently, South African empirical evidence was supplied by 
Hoffman (2012) as discussed in Section 3.6, while other international evidence was presented 
in Section 2.2.3. This measure was calculated as follows: 
 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡) = 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡)                                                                    (4.6)                                                     
 
4.3.2 Alternative Model Specifications 
 
In addition to the base model specification, other models were used to test overreaction 
for a one week holding period (this being tested for the period 2000 to 2015), as well as 
to compare market and company volatility over the period 2008-2009. The former is 
tested using Equation 4.7, with the latter being examined by Equations 4.8 and 4.9.    
 
𝑌𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                 (4.7)                                                                                             
 
𝑌𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽6𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                 (4.8)                                                                                             
 
𝑌𝑖,[𝑡,𝑡+1] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝑂𝐺(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +
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Where: 
𝑌𝑖,[𝑡,𝑡+1] 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛  
𝑌𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑎𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡  
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 




)𝑖,𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡  
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 
𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡) 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑖 
ɛ𝑖,𝑡                             
4.4 Regression Assumptions Tests 
 
A selection of exploratory and diagnostic checks were performed on the raw data to determine 
the sample quality and identify problem areas that would require further work and refinement 
to ensure that meaningful regression results were obtained. If any of these assumptions are 
violated, then any statistical insights derived from the models may be misleading or unjustified. 
   
The tests performed verify suitability based on compliance with five principal regression 
assumptions, as follows: 
 
 There is a  linear relationship between dependent and independent variables 
 No multicollinearity exists betyween the independent variables, 
 No serial autocorrelation is present 
 The data is normally distributed, and  
 There is constant variance of error terms (homoscedasticity). 
 
The following subsections will provide some context for these assumptions, discuss the tests of 
the sample for compliance, and analyse the results of these checks.  
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4.4.1 Linear Relationship and Additivity 
 
The linearity assumption implies that the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables can be captured and modelled linearly when all else is constant. In addition, the 
effects as measured by the independent variables, are additive. The last implication is that the 
coefficient for one variable is not determined by specific values of another independent 
variables. Violation of this assumption is highly problematic as it results in biased estimates of 
the coefficients due to complete model misspecification. This is a major problem compared to 
other violations of assumptions which do not introduce a bias and only lead to less efficient 
estimates. The diagnostic check for non-linearity is a collection of regression error values 
(residuals) plotted against the different independent variables. A systematic pattern in these 
plots indicates some non-linearity. The figures in Appendix A represent the matrix of these 
residual plots and there are no systematic patterns discernible lending support to the notion 





In multivariate regressions it is possible to have correlated independent variables. This issue 
would limit the predictive power of the model with respect to conclusions about individual 
variables, or how they relate to other independent variables, even if their overall effect on the 
dependent variable was accurate. A small degree of multicollinearity may be acceptable, but 
greater multicollinearity is problematic. One issue is that higher multicollinearity may produce 
inaccurate estimates for coefficients and hence introduce large errors in the predictions 
(Chatterjee et al, 2000). Another implication is that the correlated variables duplicate some of 
the effect and this renders one of them somewhat redundant. Of greater concern is that the 
standard errors of the affected estimates may be much larger and cause a type two error 
(failure to reject the null hypothesis, when it is false). Lastly, small changes in the independent 
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variables may lead to unjustified large changes in the predicted values due to more than one 
variable being affected as a consequence of the correlation (Belsley, 1991).   
 
A correlation matrix was used to detect any multicollinearity, the results of which are noted in 
the table below.  
  




Correlations are small between independent variables, ranging from -0.267 to 0.231. There is 
no cause for corrective measures (such as model reformation), since there do not seem to be 
any significant relationships between these variables.  
 
4.4.3 Serial autocorrelation of the Error term 
 
Regressions of time series assume that there is statistical independence of the error terms, 
which implies no serial correlation (no relationship between consecutive errors). If this 
assumption is violated, then the coefficient estimators will not remain the best unbiased 
versions and the standard errors will tend to be larger leading to smaller observed t-values.  
There are two tests used to detect autocorrelation, the residuals versus time plot and the 
Durbin-Watson statistic. The latter is a test of significance at lag t-1, and approximately equal to 





Ave_R -0.037 1 BTM
BTM 0.132 -0.054 1 log MV
log MV -0.185 0.107 -0.183 1 log PE
log PE -0.134 -0.222 0.231 -0.267 1 R
R -0.01 -0.126 -0.006 0.015 -0.003 1 Vol
Vol -0.302 0.024 0.028 0.032 0.103 -0.026 1
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It is calculated as follows: 
 






                                                                                        (4.10)                                                                                            
 
For this sample the Durbin-Watson statistic was 1.701, which implies no significant 
autocorrelation.  The residuals versus time plot is shown below. Considering the diagram, there 
is no apparent relationship between sequential errors. This adds support to the conclusion from 
the Durbin-Watson test.  
 
Figure 7: Serial Autocorrelation diagnostic plot 
 
4.4.4 Normal distribution of the error term  
 
The error term is assumed to be normally and randomly distributed such that 𝑒𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2). This 
is an assumption introduced to strengthen the t-tests and is usually only an important 
consideration for small samples. There are limited issues due to a violation of the normality 
assumption, as it does not introduce bias or inefficiency to the coefficient estimates.  It is 
mainly useful for the determination of the observed p-values. When the sample has a 
sufficiently large number of observations (which is the case here), the Central Limit Theorem 

















Model 1 for R_ALSI    (6 variables, n=9045)
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Three tests were used to test for this regression assumption with regards to the underlying 
data, namely the normal probability and quantity plots, and the Anderson-Darling test. If the 
errors are follow the assumed distribution, then the plotted points should deviate very little 
from the diagonal line. If there is a bow-shaped pattern, this would suggest excessive skewness. 
A concern may be that there are not enough data points on either side of the mean or that 
there are significant outliers. The Anderson-Darling test is a statistical test for normality which 
adds another layer of testing to the visual tests from the plots. Whereas the plots only consider 
skewness and kurtosis, the Anderson-Darling test analyses the entire distribution. Below are 
the results for all the tests and the analysis thereof.  
 
Figure 8: Q-Q plot  
 
 
The Q-Q plot shows a reasonably good fit to the theoretical normal distribution. There is limited 
deviation from the reference line suggesting that at least on visual inspection there are no 
major issues.  
  
The Anderson-Darling test uses a statistic to capture the degree of distributional fit makes no 
assumptions of distribution parameter values. It provides a numerical estimate of distributional 
deviation from an assumed distribution based on the frequency of observations following a 
uniform distribution. The test statistic A2 is calculated as follows: 
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𝐴2 = −𝑛 − ∑(2𝑖 − 1)
𝑛
𝑖=1
/𝑛 (ln (𝐹(𝑌𝑖)) + ln(1 − 𝐹(𝑌𝑛+1−𝑖))                                                    (4.11) 
 
An adjusted measure is suggested by D’Agostino (1986) which was used in this study: 
 






)                                                                                                                (4.12) 
 
The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level if 𝐴∗2 > 0.752. This sample yielded 
an 𝐴∗2 = 0.658, which implies that the assumption of a normal error distribution is not 
rejected.  
   
4.4.5 Constant variance of the error terms  
 
The variance of the error term is assumed to be homoscedastic, which implies that these terms 
display constant variance, irrespective of variation in time or values of the independent terms. 
Similar to serial autocorrelation, a violation of this assumption will render the current 
coefficient estimators no longer the best linear unbiased estimator. In addition to this, the 
standard errors of the coefficient estimators may become biased and cause inferences to 
become inaccurate as well. Two plots are used to test for this assumption- residuals versus 
time, and residuals versus independent variables. The first plot checks for any trend in an error 
variance as a function of time. The latter is used as a substitute instead of a residuals versus 
predicted values plot, since errors may be slightly larger for predicted values generated by 
extreme values for the dependent variables. In any case, errors that are systematically larger or 
smaller are a worrying observation. The residuals versus time plot was included in Section 4.3.3, 
and had no time related trend. The matrix of residuals versus independent variables was 
similarly included in Appendix A, and also had no visible trend. These combined depictions from 
these charts suggest no issues related to variance.  
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4.5 Trading Strategy Testing 
 
In order to extend any insights from the statistical analysis to practical applications, there 
is a need to test the profit potential for share price return reversals on the JSE. A contrarian 
strategy is used to capture returns due to short term reversals of large single-day share 
price movements, using one day and five day holding periods for included shares. There 
are two types of portfolios created, namely the portfolio of gainers (companies that 
experience single day share price increases in excess of 5% or 10%, depending on the 
specific model used), and a portfolio of losers (companies that experience single day share 
price declines in excess of 5% or , or 10%). This is based on an absolute prior day return 
value trade selection process, which is in contrast to the commonly used relative 
performance share selection process, which selects shares lying at the extremes of daily 
price performance relative to other shares. The trading style is based on a contrarian view 
that relies on short term return reversals. The portfolio returns are compared with a 
market benchmark, the JSE All Share Index (ALSI), and are adjusted for risk using the 
Sharpe ratio. The analysis covers different periods and includes the Global Financial Crisis 
of 2008. The treatment of transaction costs is as a hurdle used to ascertain realistic returns 
from such short term trading horizons, if significant profits are found.  
 
4.5.1 Share allocation and trading process 
 
A two-step approach was used to form three ‘portfolio’14 types as described below. The first 
step involved the identification and selection of securities with large single day price 
movements. This was based on the same criteria used to include companies in the sample for 
the share price overreaction analysis described earlier in this thesis. These were companies 
with large single day price movements. The one day returns and five day returns (based on daily 
returns rolled over) subsequent to these shifts were also recorded.  
                                                          
14 A portfolio in the sense of a collection of shares held concurrently and traded similarly.  
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The second step was the allocation of these shares to either of two portfolios, namely the 
gainers (shares that closed up by more than the cut-off amount in a single day) and losers 
(shares that went down by more than the cut-off amount in a single day) portfolios. Henceforth 
these two groups will respectively be referred to as the “gainers” and the “losers”. The third 
portfolio only contained the All Share index instrument.  
 
The strategy for the gainers involves taking a short position on the shares that have increased in 
excess of the cut-offs, and subsequently buying them back at the end of previously defined 
holding period (one or five days) to cover the short position. Similarly, the losers are bought 
and held for either one or five days, and then sold. For one day holding periods, the portfolios 
would in practice be recomposed daily after selling the previous day’s shares and calculating 
the holding period return. The difference between the one day holding period and the five day 
holding period strategy is that the latter would be allocated five times more frequently than the 
former. Essentially this is summarized via the following rules in the table below: 
 
Table 6: Summary of share selection and trading process 
Rule 5% and 10% cut-off -5% and -10% cut-off 
Selection Rule Share has the previous day’s 
return in excess of the cut-off 
Share has the previous day’s return 
more negative than the cut-off 
Allocation Rule Assign to the gainers portfolio Assign to the losers portfolio 
Trading Rule 
(Contrarian) 
Take a short position on the share 
and cover short within one day or 
five trading days 
Buy the share and sell it within one 
day or five trading days 
 
An equally weighted portfolio allocation method was used for all the eligible shares based on 
their previous day’s return. This weighting is used here as it avoids any performance attribution 
issues arising from the choice of initial weights. In addition, Plyakha, Uppal and Vilkov (2012) 
noted in their study on why equally weighted portfolios outperform other methods, that the 
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higher excess returns were due to the rebalancing required to maintain equal weights, which is 
a contrarian strategy that uses reversals as well as unsystematic risk. In practice, there are of 
course limitations to such a portfolio allocation method when using small market cap shares 
and those with low liquidity. The next section will elaborate on the methodology for portfolio 
returns measurement.  
 
4.5.2 Contrarian and Momentum trading strategies 
  
The existence of contrarian profits can be explained to some extent by the overreaction 
hypothesis, as a negative autocorrelation in returns is the common assumption for most 
overreaction theories (Lo & MacKinlay, 1990). Contrarian strategies can benefit from 
overreaction to an isolated event, which results in a return reversal. There are however, some 
overreaction studies such as that of Choi and Jayaraman (2009) which attempt to explain the 
contrarian profits only after large price falls. This uses a weaker condition, as returns do not 
have to be negatively auto-correlated. On the other hand, momentum strategies benefit from 
gradually spreading news about the event among investors, which results in the same sign of 
returns after the event as during the event (Forner & Marhuenda, 2003). In this dissertation, 
the investigation is whether a contrarian strategy based on return reversals in conjunction with 
non-standard holding periods might provide an advantage when compared to a more passive 
market strategy. 
 
4.5.3 Return Measures 
 
The fact that South African listed equities are the only asset class in the portfolios reduces the 
amount of asset performance attribution issues as it circumvents differences in asset return 
components and other asset variations.  
 
To measure the returns of the individual shares that made up the portfolios, the one day and 
five day holding period returns calculated on the total returns index. The portfolio performance 
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was evaluated using the Sharpe ratio to provide a risk adjusted returns measure. Based on 
modern portfolio theory, the portfolio return is calculated from the individual share holding 
period returns (𝑅𝑖) as: 
 
                                                                                                              (4.13) 





                                                                                     (4.14) 
 
As a standalone measure, the portfolio returns do not provide a complete or relative 
performance measure. To allow for a meaningful benchmarking investigation on any value 
added through the use of the short term reversals strategy, the Sharpe ratio is used.  
 
The basis for the Sharpe ratio was provided by Roy (1952) in the maximisation of: 
 
 
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛−𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠
                                                                                               (4.15)                                                         
 
Sharpe (1966) then formalised this as the return-to-volatility ratio as follows: 
 
𝑆 = 𝐸(𝑅 − 𝑟𝑓)/√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅)                                                                                                                     
(4.16)                                                                            
 
This was later amended to the modern Sharpe ratio which allowed the use of any benchmark: 
 
𝑆 = 𝐸(𝑅 − 𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘)/√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅 − 𝑟𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘)                                                                            
(4.17)                                                                      
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The Sharpe ratio’s suitability is based on its simplicity and limited computational requirements 
as it can be calculated from the returns without the need to ascertain their sources, for 
instance, the portfolio manager’s skill or other difficult to quantify characteristics. It is also 
usable for any holding period as the frequency is not an issue as long as the returns and 
variances are for the same investment horizon. The Sharpe ratio also accounts for both 
unsystematic and systematic portfolio risk and hence is preferred to the Treynor ratio, which 
only accounts for the latter.  
 
4.5.4 Transaction Costs 
 
A limited number of studies consider transaction costs when testing trading strategies based on 
overreaction. Choudhary and Sethi (2014), for instance, reason that transaction costs may be 
offset by the share dividend yields, if these are excluded from the return calculations. For 
relatively higher frequency trading activity such as that suggested in the one day and five day 
holding periods, the transaction costs have to be noted due to the very short horizon portfolio 
rebalancing requirements. There has been evidence of short term profits in excess of 
transaction costs, such as was found by Bowman and Iverson (1998) in the first week of one 
portfolio in their overreaction study in New Zealand, or Zi et al (2014) in the USA. These 
transaction costs will be deducted as a final level of testing if statistically significant ALSI-
adjusted returns are uncovered through the t-tests. This is consistent with Atkins and Dyl (1990) 
in their study of daily reversals in the United States, which only considered transaction costs for 
observed significant and profitable trading returns.  
 
There are several mandatory charges as well as a brokerage commission, which is often the 
largest component of transaction costs. The minimum transaction costs available for an 
individual investor in South Africa trading shares are approximately as indicated in Table 7 on 
the following page:  
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Table 7: Summary of JSE share transaction costs 
Description % of Traded Value 
Broker commission* 0.25 
Settlement and administration 0.075 
Investor protection levy (IPL) and 
administration 
0.0002 
Value-added tax (VAT) 0.0455 
Securities transfer tax and administration** 0.25 
Total costs for the buy side of the trade 0.6207 
Total costs for the sell side of the trade 0.3707 
Total cost including the buy and sell 
transaction (round trip expense) 
0.9914 
 
*Varies greatly based on the brokerage firm. The commission indicated here is as per 
www.easyequities.co.za.  














Based on a combination of analysis of prior literature and exploratory data analysis, some 
areas of specific research have been developed as testable hypotheses to address the key 
research questions. These are summarised as follows: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Short term share return reversals exist on the JSE 
 Hypothesis 2: Upward and downward share return reversals differ 
 Hypothesis 3: Short term share return reversals are altered in times of financial turmoil 
 Hypothesis 4: An economically significant reversals trading strategy exists.  
 
The statistical procedure employed for the analytical process in this study was 
multivariate regression, which used abnormal returns as the dependent variable. A 
discussion of South Africans returns research informed the choice and validated the key 
variables (𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, 𝑉𝑖,𝑡,𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑡, 𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) and𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡)) used in the 
empirical models. There were two model specifications used to test the linear 
relationships over one trading day, and two that cover one trading week. These 
regressions are performed for the periods July 2000 to December 2002, June 2008 to 
December 2009, and the overall period July 2000 to June 2015. The regression 
assumptions were tested using diagnostic checks and the data did not reveal any 
violations. 
 
The final sections provided the methodology to test the practical applications if significant 
reversals are found. A contrarian strategy based on absolute price movements on the previous 
day is suggested with a one day or five day buy and sell window for each share. Portfolios are 
formed using an equal weight allocation and Sharpe ratios are calculated over different 
horizons to compare the performance with that of the ALSI. Transaction costs are calculated as 
approximately 1% of trade value (0.9914%) and will be deducted if statistically significant 
profits are available over and above the market benchmark.  
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This chapter will present the results and conclusions from the empirical analysis of the sample 
data. Section 5.2 will present the regression outputs of the various models and explain the key 
findings in terms of the regression variables used. This section will also present the findings in 
relation to similar work from past literature. Robustness checks on the results were performed 
and their outputs are then used in Section 5.3 to check for the reliability of the results. In 
addition, the regression models will be validated using statistical analyses. Section 5.4 
contextualises the results in relation to the Research Hypotheses. Finally, Section 5.5 
summarises the most salient details of this chapter and summarises the research findings. 
  
5.2 Regression Outputs and Results 
 
This section will highlight the evidence for the regression variables. First, the multivariate 
regression findings will be compared with those from related studies in different countries on 
the basis of important effects and variables. These are presented variable by variable, which 
should not be taken to imply that they are the results from univariate regressions, as this was 
not the case. There were four core regressions based on the four models specifications outlined 
in Chapter 4. The table below highlights some of the descriptive summary statistics relating to 
the maximum and minimum values , as well as the mean and event probabilities of returns that 
exceeded the cut-offs. The large price shifts range from about 59.48% to -39.54, with a 
probability of 2.45% for a share price movement in excess of 5% in either direction, and a 0.23% 
probability of a share price move beyond the 10% and -10% cut-off values. These probability 
values suggest that such significant movements are uncommon for the most part.   
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Return cut-off Maximum Minimum  Mean  Probability  
Model 1 
and 2 
9117 5% and -5% 59.48% -39.54% 0.73% 2.45% 
Model 3 
and 4 
855 10% and -10% 59.48% -39.54% 3.19% 0.23% 
 
A summary of the models and description of the variables are provided below: 
 
Table 9: Summary of regression variables 





𝑌𝑖,[𝑡,𝑡+1] or 𝑌𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] 
Abnormal Returns = Holding 
Period return – ALSI return 
  




Return for that share the day 





Sample average of last 60 




𝑉𝑖,𝑡 or 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑡 
Volatility over the last 60 
trading days for that share. 
Return volatility for Models 1 
and 2, and the SAVI for 











Pr xy for firm size effect, log 






Proxy for firm value effect, log 
of Book to Market ratio 
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Table 10: Summary of regression models 





5% and -5% 
One day abnormal returns and 





10% and -10% 
Five day abnormal returns and 





5% and -5% 
One day abnormal returns and 






10% and -10% 
Five day abnormal returns and 
uses market volatility 
 
 
Model 1: 𝑌𝑖,[𝑡,𝑡+1] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                            (4.1)                                              
 
Model 2: 𝑌𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                            (4.7)                                              
 
Model 3: 𝑌𝑖,[𝑡+1,𝑡+5] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                            (4.8)                                                                                             
 
Model 4: 𝑌𝑖,[𝑡,𝑡+1] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  + 𝛽4𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡) + ɛ𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                            (4.9)                                              
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5.2.1 Return Reversals (𝑹𝒊,𝒕) 
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the previous period’s return which is used as a base on which to test for a one day 
or one week reversal. The regression coefficient’s value estimates the effect of a 1% 
increase in 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 on the dependent variable. A negative coefficient would suggest a reversal 
effect for the relevant holding or trading period. Considering reversals for the aggregate 
of events (large upward and downward share return events), there was strong evidence 
for reversals over a one day holding period as seen in Table 11 for Model 1. The 
coefficients were consistently negative and significant at the 1% level for Models 1 to 4, 
regardless of whether cut-offs of 5% or 10% were used. Most notably, the coefficient for 
the 10% cut-off was nearly three to four times larger than that of the 5% cut-off for all the 
models. This suggests that for more extreme price movements, stronger reversals are 
more likely. This is consistent with the initial formulation of the overreaction hypothesis 
as provided by DeBondt and Thaler (1985). The coefficients varied from -0.0727% to -
0.4058%, showing a slight to moderate effect of returns on the day prior to the holding 
period. These are much smaller than the coefficients obtained by Lobe and Rieks (2011) 
in their German study, which indicated reversal values of 1.75% to 3.03%. When 
comparing the Return Volatility and Volatility Index Models, there are no large differences 
between the results for this variable, either in terms of magnitude, significance or 
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Table 11: Regression Statistics for (𝑹𝒊,𝒕), coefficients are in percentage (%) terms 
 
 
5% and -5% cut-off 10% and -10% cut-off 
 Coefficient t statistic p value Coefficient t statistic p value 





































































***Significant at 1% significance level 
 
5.2.2 Average Return (𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕) 
 
The average return is the sample mean of each share’s returns over the 60 trading days prior to 
a large price movement beyond either ±5% or ±10%. The average return appeared to be one of 
the most influential and consistently significant variable when explaining abnormal returns. This 
consistency is aligned with the results of Lobe and Rieks (2011), where the average return is 
found quite a significant and influential variable. This relationship is positive with the 
dependent variable and would suggest a momentum effect to some extent. For Models 1 and 2, 
all the coefficients were significant at 1% and were more pronounced when cut-offs of 10% 
were used. Model 1 provided coefficients from 2.72% and 6.82%, whereas Model 2 had values 
of 2.69% and 6.91% for the 5% and 10% cut-offs, respectively. The notably high contribution of 
average returns might suggest that an increasingly positive or negative average return prior to a 
large price shift signals a breakout of price behaviour from the norm. For the SAVI models very 
similar results were obtained, which is expected, given that only the volatility measure was 
different. The results are summarised below: 
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Table 12: Regression Statistics for(𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕), coefficients are in percentage (%) terms 
 
 
5% and -5% cut-off 10% and -10% cut-off 











































































***Significant at 1% significance level 
 
5.2.3 Return Volatility(𝑽𝒊,𝒕) and the Volatility Index (𝑺𝑨𝑽𝑰𝒕) 
 
This variable is calculated based on the sample standard deviation using three trading months 
(60 trading days) of share returns before an abnormal return day. In addition to this, the market 
volatility index (SAVI) was used as a separate explanatory variable to determine which volatility 
measure is more indicative for abnormal returns during the period 2008 to 2009. Return 
volatility is a significant predictor of excess abnormal returns in the context of overreaction for 
only two of the eight regressions. These are all for Model 1, which used one day abnormal 
returns as the dependent variable, and returns volatility as the volatility measure. For the 5% 
and 10% cut-offs, the coefficients were 1.62 % and 6.83 %, and both were significant at a 1.25% 
level. Notably, the 10% cut-off yields an estimate that is nearly four times larger than the 5% 
cut-off. This is a similar observation to the results for return reversals and average return, 
further supporting the idea that larger price movements as a subset, are more sensitive to 
these variables.  
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In drawing a comparison between the predictive power of the two volatility measures, it is 
found that the SAVI measure is not statistically significant when considering increases and 
decreases together. In Section 5.4.3, both measures are used in providing a conclusion for 
Hypothesis 3, which suggested that a significant impact of financial turmoil on share price 
overreaction exists. The table below summarises key regression results for this variable.     
 
Table 13: Regression Statistics for Return Volatility(𝑽𝒊,𝒕) and the Volatility Index (𝑺𝑨𝑽𝑰𝒕) , 
coefficients are in percentage (%) terms 
 5% and -5% cut-off 10% and -10% cut-off  
 Coefficient t statistic p value Coefficient t statistic p value 















































 ***Significant at 1% significance level 
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The price-to-earnings ratio provides an estimate for how expensive a share is relative to its 
earnings potential, and is computed by dividing the share price by its earnings per share value. 
Some slightly contradictory results were obtained for the effect of the price-to-earnings ratio. 
All the models had highly statistically significant and positive coefficients for this variable when 
the 5% and -5% cut-offs were used, but for share price change cut-offs of 10% and -10% the 
coefficients were not statistically significant at the 1% level. The latter values ranged from 
0.011451% to 0.014592%.  For the higher (±10%) cut-offs the coefficients for the log (P/E) 
variable were not statistically significant for all four models, but interestingly were negative in 
all cases except Model 1.  
 
Conventional South African returns modelling results support a negative coefficient for the 
price-to-earnings variable, based on the works of Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), which is 
contradictory to these results. The coefficients for size and price-to-earninigs are only 
marginally different in the results here, which is a different pattern to that shown by Page 
(1996) and Jaffe, Keirn and Westerfield (1989), all of whom found that the effect of the price-
to-earnings ratio on returns was stronger and more significant than the size effect. These 
results are also different from those of Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011), who found 
empirical support on the JSE for the hypothesis that low P/E companies offer abnormal returns. 
Most of the work has been on basic returns modelling and not overreaction specifically, so 
although they offer some basis for comparison, they are not an absolute benchmark.  
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Table 14: Regression Statistics for𝑳𝒐𝒈(
𝑷
𝑬
)𝒊,𝒕, coefficients are in percentage (%) terms 
 
 
5% and -5% cut-off 10% and -10% cut-off 
 Coefficient t statistic p value Coefficient t statistic p value 




















































***Significant at 1% significance level 
 
5.2.5 Market Value/Company Size (𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑴𝑽𝒊,𝒕)) 
 
The inclusion of this variable is supported by Section 2.2.4, which documented the size effect in 
international work, as well as Section 3.6 – in South Africa through the body of work of Van 
Rensburg and Robertson (2003), Basiewicz and Auret (2010), Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger 
(2011) and Hoffman (2012). This variable is an important component of returns regression, 
since it is a factor to measure the size effect of a company, and is part of the three factor CAPM 
model. Consistent evidence was obtained for a negative relationship between company size 
and abnormal returns when a 5% and -5% cut-off was used for large price movements. The 
coefficient values ranged from -0.01546% to -0.02526% for the four models, with observed 
significance levels very close to zero. This is consistent with international evidence in this 
regard, such as that as the findings of Lobe and Rieks (2011) on the Frankfurt Share Exchange 
over the period 1988 to 2007, of a significant size effect for short term overreaction. Similarly, 
there is extensive South African evidence of a statistically significant impact of company size on 
returns in the JSE as per the works of Van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), Basiewicz and Auret 
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(2010), Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011) and Hoffman (2012). However, very different 
evidence was obtained when 10% and -10% cut-offs were used. The coefficients were much 
smaller in magnitude (-0.0006% to 0.0002%) and the observed p-values were extremely large, 
implying that the size coefficient is not statistically significant for this cut-off.  
 
Table 15: Regression Statistics for𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑴𝑽𝒊,𝒕), coefficients are in percentage (%) terms 
 
 
5% and -5% cut-off 10% and -10% cut-off 


















































 ***Significant at 1% significance level 
 
5.2.6 Book-to-Market Value (𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑩𝑻𝑴𝒊,𝒕)) 
 
This variable measures the company value effect as measured in the three factor CAPM model. 
As mentioned previously, prior research has provided positive evidence of the influence of 
book-to-market (through the value effect) on abnormal returns, both internationally and in the 
South African market. Considering the results when using a 5% and -5% cut-off, all the models 
(with the exception of Model 2) yielded statistically significant coefficients at the 5% 
significance level. The coefficients themselves ranged from 0.001636% to 0.002715%, 
suggesting a weakly positive relationship. Prior work on the contribution of the value effect to 
short-term share price overreaction in South Africa is not available, but nonetheless Basiewicz 
and Auret (2010) and Hoffman (2012) found that the value effect is a significant factor in 
predicting share returns. This is to some extent consistent with the findings of this study.    
89 | P a g e  
 
 
When cut-offs of 10% and -10% were used, much stronger and significant values were 
obtained, with the exception of Model 1. This suggests that for more extreme price 
movements, the abnormal returns are better explained by the value effect.  
 
Table 16: Regression Statistics for 𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑩𝑻𝑴𝒊,𝒕), coefficients are in percentage (%) terms 
 
 
5% and -5% cut-off 10% and -10% cut-off 
 Coefficient t statistic p value Coefficient t statistic p value 































































**Significant at 2.5% significance level 
*Significant at 5% significance level 
 
5.3 Robustness Checks by Coefficient Persistence Testing 
 
In order to check the consistency and reliability of the results, some checks were implemented 
to assess how persistent the statistical significance of the variables were, and the latter was 
used to confirm the differences between large price increases and decreases.  
In addition to the basic one day share price return cut-offs (5% and 10%) that were part of the 
core regression testing, additional regressions were used with return cut-offs of 7.5%, 12.5% 
and 15%. This tested the consistency of the statistical significance and magnitude of the 
variables at different abnormal return determination levels. In addition, the division of the 
sample into different periods (Section 5.4.3) also allowed for a check on whether the 
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phenomenon was consistent across the entire sample period of 2000 – 2015, specifically 
considering that this period included both bull and bear market periods, as well as the global 
financial crisis of 2008. Therefore, both magnitudinal and periodic consistency were addressed 
in providing confirmation or refuting any of the hypotheses.    
 
Considering Model 1 regressions, there are two variables that exhibit a clear trend as the cut-
offs are varied, namely the return reversals (𝑅𝑖,𝑡) and average return variables (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡), which 
both show consistently increasing coefficient values at higher cut-offs. This is consistent for all 
the remaining models as well, with no difference in the sign and slight differences in statistical 
significance for both of these variables. Return Volatility(𝑉𝑖,𝑡) and the Volatility Index (𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐼𝑡) 
are only significant at the smallest (5%) cut-off, with a value of 1.6184%, suggesting very limited 
explanatory power for a one day holding period.  
 
The effect of Price-to-earnings ((𝐿𝑜𝑔(
𝑃
𝐸
)𝑖,𝑡) is slight and loses statistical significance after the 
10% and-10% cut-off, suggesting that it is not that relevant for larger price shifts. The size effect 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑡)) is also not statistically significant after the 10% cut-off, but maintained a small yet 
negative value, while being statistically significant at the smaller cut-offs. The book-to-market 
ratio (𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐵𝑇𝑀𝑖,𝑡)) was the least influential and significant of all the variables. Statistical 
significance was only achieved at the 5% and -5% cut-off, and the size of the coefficient was 
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Table 17: Model 1 coefficients at different cut-offs 














































































































***Significant at 1% significance level 
**Significant at 2.5% significance level 
*Significant at 5% significance level 
 
Similar to Model 1, for Model 2 the coefficients for return reversals and average return proved 
to be consistent and robust irrespective of the different cut-offs. Another similarity was the 
generally increasing values as the cut-offs were increased. The volatility measure is not even 
significant at the 5% level at the smallest cut-off, and as such is a relatively minor effect. P/E 
was significant for the 5% and 10% cut-off, while the size effect was consistently negative and 
significant (although to a diminishing extent) for the 5%, 7.5% and 10% cut-off. The book-to-
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Table 18: Model 2 coefficients at different cut-offs 









































































 ***Significant at 1% significance level 
**Significant at 2.5% significance level 
*Significant at 5% significance level 
 
Consistent with Models 1 and 2, the reversal and average return variables are statistically 
significant at the 5% level for all the cut-off values for Model 3. Larger cut-offs correspond to 
larger coefficients in the case of both variables. Volatility is not significant at any of the cut-offs 
as used in this five day holding period model. P/E and the company size variables are again 
relatively trivial in size and only significant at the 5% and 7.5% cut-offs. The book-to-market 
ratio is the second smallest coefficient at 0.002715%, and is only statistically significant at the 
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Table 19: Model 3 coefficients at different cut-offs 
 












































































 ***Significant at 1% significance level 
**Significant at 2.5% significance level 
*Significant at 5% significance level 
 
Combining the analysis of the three models above, there are a few consolidated conclusions, 
given that the results of Model 4 mirror those of Model 3. The reversal variable and average 
return were consistently statistically significant at α=5% for all models at all the cut-offs. 
Average return was always the largest coefficient. Book-to-market ratio and the volatility 
measures had the most limited significance and also happened to have the smallest 
coefficients. Size and P/E were significant for smaller cut-offs and had small magnitudes in 
general. In conclusion, the reversal, average return, size and P/E variables are significant over 
one day and five day holding periods, whereas the book-to-market and volatility variables were 
trivial in explaining short term overreaction. This is consistent with, and lends support to, the 
analysis presented in Section 5.2. 
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Table 20: Model 4 coefficients at different cut-offs 
 
 












































































 ***Significant at 1% significance level 
*Significant at 5% significance level 
 
5.4 Further Analysis and Discussion 
 
Overall, the results align with the majority of prior work in this area. Conclusive findings were 
obtained for all the hypotheses with additional robustness checks performed to ensure 
reliability. The following sections will expand on the hypothesis-specific evidence.  
 
5.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Short Term Share Return reversals Exist on the JSE 
 
In this research project substantial evidence was found in support of short term share return 
reversals on the JSE. All the model specifications yielded meaningful estimates for the reversal 
variable (𝑅𝑖,𝑡). Reversals were tested over one and five day holding periods and in all cases, 
reversal coefficients were predominantly negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. In 
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the South African context there are no studies to directly compare the reversals to. Tables 21 
and 22 below summarises the coefficients relating to short term reversals for all the model 
specifications. An analysis of these is provided in this section.  
 
Considering the regression results for the return prior to a one day holding period, robust and 
consistent results were obtained for both the return volatility and the SAVI models. Excluding 
the 10% and -10% cut-offs, there are only marginal differences in the coefficient values, all of 
which are highly statistically significant. The negative sign in both models and at all cut-offs 
lends strong support to a one day reversal of large price movements.  
 
Table 21: One day reversal coefficients 






























 ***Significant at 1% significance level 
**Significant at 2.5% significance level 
*Significant at 5% significance level 
 
Focusing on the five day reversals, similar observations are noted. All the values are negative 
and highly significant, with an increasing value for larger cut-offs. This supports the hypothesis 
of short term reversals, and suggests that the larger the price movement, the larger the 
reversal. The values exhibit large differences between Models 2 and 4 at the 12.5% and 15% 
cut-offs. However given that the periods the models cover are different (15 years versus 8 
years) this may be expected. Given the evidence for short term reversals, there is sufficient 
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The next section discusses and presents evidence for the Hypothesis that the reversals for 
upward and downward large price shifts differ (Hypothesis 2). Furthermore, Section 5.4.3 
contains the evidence for Hypothesis 3, which asserts that short term reversals are affected by 
financial crises.  
 
Table 22: Five day reversal coefficients 
 
 
























***Significant at 1% significance level 
**Significant at 2.5% significance level 
*Significant at 5% significance level 
 
5.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Upward and Downward Share Return reversals differ in 
magnitude 
 
This section covers the comparison of reversals for upward and downward price shocks, with 
the null hypothesis stating that there exists a difference in magnitude between the upwards 
and downwards share return reversals on the JSE. Two types of analyses are performed, namely 
a coefficient comparison at different cut-offs, and a two sample means test for the 5% and 10% 
cut-offs. The table below juxtaposes the various coefficients at the different cut-offs to provide 
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As observed in Table 23, the coefficients vary greatly when comparing increases and decreases 
and across cut-offs. These differences are both in magnitude and direction as several instances 
of opposite directionality are noted. Although not a conclusive test on its own, these 
observations motivate the case for further statistical testing to conclude on the extent of the 
differences, which is done via a t-test.    
 
Table 23: Regression coefficients, Increases and Decreases 5% and 10% cut-off points  
























































Test 1: two sided 
𝐻0: µ𝑈𝑃𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷 = µ𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷                                         
𝐻1: µ𝑈𝑃𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷 ≠ µ𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑊𝐴𝑅𝐷                                                                                                                  
 
Reject the null hypothesis if: t statistic > critical value of t or (-)t < (-) critical value 
 
The statistics are calculated from the price changes as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                       (5.1)                                                




                                                                                                                    (5.2) 
 
𝑋1 ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑈𝑝𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠  
𝑋2 ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 
𝑠1
2 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑈𝑝𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑠2 
2 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑛1𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑈𝑝𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙 
𝑛2 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙  
 
The tables below summarise the results from the t-tests performed and the return reversals 
data for both the primary cut-offs. In both cases, based on the calculated t-statistics and 
observed p-values, the null hypothesis was rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis of 
inequality. These findings lend support to Hypothesis 2 and it is not rejected. This is not a very 
surprising result given that there is no clear theoretical reason which asserts equality of 
reversals.  
 
These findings contrast with the results of JSE overreaction study by Frisch et al (2014), which 
focused on a longer horizon and found that both positive and negative price shifts were likely to 
be followed by positive returns, which implied that only large declines experienced reversals 
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Table 24: Result of t-test for 5% and -5% cut-off 
  Gainers Losers 
Mean of Reversal term 0.000838 0.002338 
Variance of Reversal term 0.001769 0.001712 
Observations 4915 4130 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
Degrees of freedom 8823  
t Stat -2.7044  
P(T<=t) two-sided test 0.04416  
t Critical two-sided test 1.961033   
RESULT 
Reject null hypothesis since t 
stat = -2.7044 < -1.96 
 
Table 25: Result of t-test for 10% and -10% cut-off 
  Gainers Losers 
Mean of Reversal term -0.0048 0.009402 
Variance of Reversal term 0.005141 0.004515 
Observations 522 333 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
Degrees of freedom 741  
t Stat -2.935  
P(T<=t) two-sided test 0.003437  
t Critical two-sided test 1.961033   
RESULT 
Reject null hypothesis since t 
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5.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Short Term Share Return reversals are exaggerated in times 
of Financial Turmoil  
 
Given the possible behavioural drivers of the share price overreaction phenomenon, it is 
conceivable that in times of high market uncertainty there would be amplified share price 
overreaction and subsequent reversals, due to distressed or erratic short term trading. Hsieh 
and Hodnett (2011) showed that mean reversals in the JSE due to overreaction, were most 
pronounced immediately after the financial crisis. To test this theory, the core regressions were 
implemented separately for the pre-, intra- and post financial crisis period as described 
previously.  
 
The results for the 5% and -5% cut-off point to stronger reversals during the crisis period 
(defined as 2008 to 2009) when considering one day reversals (Models 1 and 3). This was not 
the case for five day reversals (Models 2 and 4), which had stronger reversals post the crisis 
period. This difference may be due to stronger behavioural drivers for smaller holding periods 
or a lower inclination to hold shares for longer leading to swifter reversals. As for the stronger 
reversals over five days post the crisis, it is possibly an artefact of longer holding periods in the 
market recovery in the years since the crisis, as the markets corrected themselves and became 
relatively more bullish. 
 
Table 26: (𝑅𝑖,𝑡) Regression coefficients for the 5% and -5% cut-offs aggregated 









































Note: For Models 3 and 4 the Pre-crisis period is 2007-2008 since the SAVI was only established in 2007 
***Significant at 1% significance level 
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Further analysing the crisis impact based on the 10% and-10% cut-offs yields similar results to 
the smaller cut-off above with respect to the one day reversals. The coefficient values are still 
much larger during the crisis period than before or after. Mixed results are obtained for this 
cut-off when using Models 2 and 4, which use five day holding periods. Model 2 presents a 
slightly higher coefficient during the crisis whereas Model 4 has its largest coefficient pre crisis 
(however this is not statistically significant). In any case, there is limited evidence for stronger 
reversals during the period when using this higher cut-off in combination with a five day 
holding period.  
 
Table 27: (𝑅𝑖,𝑡) Regression coefficients for the 10% and -10% cut-offs aggregated 






































Note: For Models 3 and 4 the Pre-crisis period is 2007-2008 since the SAVI was only established in 2007 
***Significant at 1% significance level 













This chapter presented the results and key findings from the statistical analysis of the data. 
Section 5.2 considered the evidence from each of the four regression models, and explained 
the results in terms of the regression variables that measured the various effects. The reversal, 
average return, size and P/E variables are significant over the one day and five day holding 
periods and were a useful suite of factors, whereas the book-to-market and volatility variables 
were trivial in explaining short term overreaction. This section also compared the findings from 
prior literature, and found agreement with some of the prevailing evidence from other markets 
- for instance the works of Lobe and Rieks (2011) and Choudhary and Sethi (2014).  
 
Robustness checks were then used in Section 5.3 to check for the reliability of the results, and 
the regression models were validated using statistical analyses. Coefficient persistence checks 
were used to check the robustness of the results, which were not diminished through these 
checks. Therefore, consistent coefficients were obtained for all variables except the book-to-
market ratio.   
 
Section 5.4 positioned the results in relation to the research hypotheses 1 to 3. Hypothesis 1 
assumed the existence of short term reversals and there were robust and consistent results for 
all the models support this. Excluding the 10% and -10% cut-offs, there are only marginal 
differences in the coefficient values, all of which are highly statistically significant. Hypothesis 2 
assumed differences in upward and downward reversals. The coefficients varied greatly when 
comparing increases and decreases across cut-offs. Two sided t-tests confirmed this, and that 
the differences were both in magnitude and direction. Hypothesis 3 held that the reversals 
were exaggerated in times of Financial Turmoil. There was limited evidence for stronger 
reversals during the period when using this higher cut-off in combination with a five day 
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In order to test the practical and economic significance of this study’s findings for share price 
return reversals on the JSE, a portfolio allocation exercise was performed to provide a 
comparative measure by testing performance relative to a market benchmark. A contrarian 
strategy is used to capture returns due to short term reversals of large single-day share price 
movements, using one day and five day holding periods for included shares. Two portfolios are 
created, namely the portfolio of gainers (companies that experience single day share price 
increases of 5% or more), and a portfolio of losers (companies that experience single day share 
price declines of 5% or more). These are compared with a market benchmark, the JSE All Share 
Index (ALSI), over different periods and in the context of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. 
Section 6.2 will explain the methodology of the process and highlight the important points, 
including portfolio weighting and returns assessment. Section 6.3 will then present the results 
and provide an analysis on the findings with respect to Hypothesis 4. The conclusion of this 
chapter then follows in Section 6.4. Monthly and annual returns are based on rolling returns 
which are the periodic average for the respective period and allowed the holding periods to 
match those actually experienced by individuals who would hold these portfolios.  
 
6.2 Results and Analysis 
 
This section will present the summarised results and analysis of the portfolio comparison 
exercise. Different performance measures were used and the comparisons are for the one day 
and five day holding period returns and cover four periods. These are the entire period (July 
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6.2.1 Portfolio Descriptive Statistics 
 
Some of the key statistics representing the portfolios are included in this section. Daily, weekly, 
monthly and yearly portfolio performance is summarised through the maximum, minimum and 
average portfolio returns. These are categorised into the gainers and losers portfolios and are 
provided for the pre, intra- and post Global Financial Crisis period.  
 
6.2.1.1 Daily Data 
 
Daily portfolio returns for all the three portfolios were calculated for the one day holding period 
as seen in Table 28 below. For the whole sample period, the losers portfolio provided larger 
upside and downside potential compared to the gainers portfolio. This is illustrated by a 
maximum daily return value which was nearly double that of the gainers portfolio (63.63% 
versus 34.24%), and a minimum daily return value which was also more extreme (-24.47% 
versus -19.13%). The daily mean return of 0.167% was also nearly three times larger than that 
of the gainers portfolio (0.056%). These trends were consistent for all three sub-periods when 
considered separately as well. Collectively, these results suggest that if absolute one day 
returns are the main concern, a contrarian strategy using the losers portfolio would offer better 
returns on average. The most extreme portfolio losses were experienced by both portfolios 
during the intra-crisis period, which was also the case for portfolio gains. This is possibly due to 
the higher uncertainty and market turmoil pushing extremes past previous highs and lows. 
Trading on these assumptions would only suit highly speculative traders with high risk appetite 
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 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.1912 -0.2446 -0.07651 -0.09787 -0.1912 -0.24466 -0.06312 -0.08074 
Maximum 0.34241 0.63634 0.136966 0.254536 0.34241 0.636341 0.1130 0.20999 
Mean 0.00056 0.00167 0.000225 0.000667 0.00067 0.002669 0.000185 0.00055 
 
6.2.1.2 Weekly Data 
 
Weekly portfolio returns were calculated for both the one day and five day holding periods as 
seen in Tables 29 and 30 below. For the one day holding period, over the period July 2000 to 
June 2015, the gainers portfolio offered larger upside and lower downside potential when 
compared to the losers portfolio. The maximum weekly return was 24.47%, which was nearly 
double that of the losers portfolio of 12.41%. The minimum weekly return for the gainers 
portfolio was -11.38%, nearly a third lower than the other portfolio’s value of -19.13%. The 
mean portfolio return of 11.80% was more than double that of the losers portfolio (5.15%). 
Both portfolios experienced their largest losses in the pre-crisis period but experienced their 
largest gains in different periods. This suggests better returns for gainers in times of crisis due 
to the larger reversals in a crisis period, and better returns for losers in a period of market 
recovery when considering the gains rolled over for a week. Portfolios are essentially 
reconstituted five times over the five days, since the holding period is only a day here, which 





106 | P a g e  
 













 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.11384 -0.19127 -0.11384 -0.19127 -0.06830 -0.11476 -0.03757 -0.06312 
Maximum 0.24466 0.12414 0.04966 0.08690 0.24466 -0.17126 -0.09787 0.12414 
Mean 0.11797 0.05151 0.020605 -0.08719 0.07727 -0.32695 0.016999 -0.07193 
  
 
The weekly returns for a five day holding period presents slightly different results to the one 
day holding period. For the entire period, the gainers portfolio provided larger upside and 
downside potential compared to the losers portfolio. The maximum value was only about one-
fifth larger than that of the losers portfolio (30.12% versus 24.99%) but the maximum loss was 
nearly double (-21.38% versus -11.99%). The weekly average portfolio returns for gainers was 
about one third smaller than that of losers (4.37% compared with 6.50%). Both portfolios 
experienced their largest weekly gains and losses during the crisis period. The results suggest 
that there was high upside potential for a contrarian strategy when using either portfolio even 
after trading costs, but this was mainly beneficial during the crisis period.  
 













 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.21384 -0.11989 -0.08554 -0.04795 -0.21384 -0.11989 -0.07057 -0.03956 
Maximum 0.301224 0.249872 0.120489 0.099949 0.301224 0.249872 0.099404 0.082458 
Mean 0.043691 0.064993 0.017477 0.025997 0.069906 0.103988 0.014418 0.021448 
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6.2.1.3 Monthly Data 
 
Monthly portfolio returns were calculated for the one day and five day holding periods as seen 
in Table 31 below. From July 2000 to June 2015, the losers portfolio provided larger upside and 
downside potential compared to the gainers portfolio. This is seen by the maximum gain which 
was considerably larger than that of the gainers portfolio (23.10% versus 13.67%) and a 
maximum loss which was three times larger (-20.36% versus -6.83%). The losers monthly mean 
return of 1.37% was however nearly half of the gainers portfolio (2.67%). These values show 
that although the losers offered potential higher gains (and losses as well), on average the 
gainers portfolio offered a better average. The most extreme portfolio losses were experienced 
by both portfolios during the post-crisis period, which was also the case for portfolio gains. This 
is unusual given that there was strong market recovery for the most part of the post-crisis 
period. Trading on these assumptions was only highly beneficial when the market was in any 
case bullish, which suggests limited use when monthly returns are considered. Again, if trading 
costs can be held to 1% or below, these results indicate a potentially profitable trading strategy 
based on short-term overreaction may be possible. 
 
 













 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.06833 -0.20356 -0.02733 -0.08143 -0.03416 -0.10178 -0.06833 -0.20356 
Maximum 0.13669 0.230957 0.054675 0.092383 0.08431 0.12171 0.13669 0.230957 
Mean 0.02666 0.013697 0.010663 0.005479 0.02932 0.015067 0.008797 0.00452 
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Considering the larger period (2000 to 2015) and a five day holding period, the gainers portfolio 
proved the better option as it provided greater upside and lower downside potential compared 
to the losers portfolio for a five day holding period. The largest monthly gain was one-fourth 
higher than that of the losers portfolio (19%), and a maximum loss of 14.9% as opposed to 
18.26%. The monthly mean return of 5.6% was also relatively higher than the 3.69% of the 
losers portfolio (0.056%). These trends were consistent for all three sub-periods when 
considered separately as well. The most extreme portfolio losses were experienced by both 
portfolios during the pre-crisis period, while the largest portfolio gains were obtained post-
crisis. An explanation for the former is unclear, however, the latter may be explained by the 
increasingly bullish market post-crisis.  
 











Post-Crisis period  
(2010-2015) 
 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.149 -0.18264 -0.149 -0.18264 -0.0894 -0.10959 -0.04917 -0.06027 
Maximum 0.261024 0.190018 0.104409 0.076007 0.182717 0.133013 0.261024 0.190018 
Mean 0.056011 0.003688 0.022405 0.001475 0.084017 0.005532 0.018484 0.001217 
 
 
6.2.1.4 Annual Data 
 
The previous subsections covered relatively short returns periods (daily, weekly and monthly). 
This section focuses on returns over a year, and provides results which can be benchmarked 
with South African inflation. Annual portfolio returns were calculated for the one day holding 
period and the aggregated statistics are shown in Table 33 below. For the whole sample period, 
the losers portfolio provided larger upside and smaller downside potential compared to the 
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gainers portfolio. This is illustrated by a gainers maximum value of 64.86% versus 44.02%, and a 
minimum value of -7.99% versus -18%. The gainers annual mean return of 21.86% was also 
more than three times that of the gainers portfolio (6.2%). The losers average returns for the 
entire period was also nearly three times larger than inflation and hence offered substantial 
real returns compared to the gainers which was on par with inflation. The most extreme 
portfolio losses were experienced by both portfolios during the intra-crisis period, which was 
also the case for portfolio gains, suggesting that exercising these strategies offered large upside 
and downside in the crisis period specifically.  
 













 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.18004 -0.07991 -0.07202 -0.03197 -0.18004 -0.07991 -0.05941 -0.02637 
Maximum 0.44024 0.6486 0.176097 0.25944 0.44024 0.6486 0.14528 0.214038 
Mean 0.06199 0.218614 0.024795 0.087446 0.06564 0.231513 0.020456 0.072143 
 
 
Table 34 below provides summary statistics for annual portfolio returns when calculated for a 
five day holding period. For the whole sample period, the gainers portfolio provided larger 
upside and downside potential compared to the losers portfolio. The largest annual gain and 
loss for the losers were 18.12% and -6.21% respectively, compared with the gainers with 
27.19% and -15.32%. These trends were also consistent for all three sub-periods that were 
separately considered. The annual mean returns are quite similar at 5.94% for the gainers, and 
4.95% for the losers. The average returns for the entire period were in the target inflation band 
suggesting these strategies were not ideal in providing real returns (and even more so if 
transaction costs are considered). 
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 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.15317 -0.06214 -0.06127 -0.02486 -0.07658 -0.03107 -0.15317 -0.06214 
Maximum 0.27192 0.18121 0.10877 0.07248 0.27192 0.18121 0.27192 0.18121 
Mean 0.059375 0.049531 0.02375 0.023812 0.065313 0.065484 0.019594 0.019645 
 
6.2.2 Hypothesis 4: An economically significant reversals trading strategy exists 
 
Hypothesis 4 states that a trading strategy on the JSE that is based on share return reversals will 
provide excess returns, effectively meaning it is economically significant and could be the basis 
for a profitable trading strategy. This is an important aspect of this project as it investigates the 
practical applications which would transfer the findings from the domain of theoretical 
conjecture to real world use. The Sharpe ratio was used for the entire period, as well as the 
different sub-periods divided into pre-, intra- and post-crisis. This provides a consistency check 
for the economic significance across the periods, especially in the context of an atypical period 
such as the Global Financial Crisis. In addition to the performance evaluation based on a simple 
comparison of benchmarked returns using the Sharpe ratio, a t-test based on unequal variances 
was performed for the portfolios to test Hypothesis 4 through the difference in sample means. 
This provides a more robust statistical method for differentiating the economic significance of 
the portfolio strategies. For any significant result of excess profits, the final step to confirm the 
validity would be the deduction of the typical buy and sell round trip transaction cost.    
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6.2.2.1 One Day Holding Period Performance 
 
Considering the mean portfolio Sharpe ratios for a one day holding period over all the sub-
periods, the losers portfolio provides positive benchmark adjusted returns per unit of volatility 
for the overall period and all the sub-periods as well.  The gainers portfolio performs similarly 
with the exception of the post-crisis period. This suggests that on a relative risk scale on 
average there were excess returns available if either portfolio strategy was used in nearly all 
the periods. When comparing the maximum and minimum Sharpe ratios for the overall period, 
losers have a larger absolute minimum than maximum (-0.26 versus 0.25) while gainers have a 
50% larger maximum than minimum (0.31 versus -0.21). These extremes suggest that either 
portfolio offers performance premiums. However, there is added risk without added return for 
the losers when compared to the gainers.  
 














 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.20983 -0.26172 -0.07134 -0.07851 -0.17053 -0.26172 -0.20983 -0.02808 
Maximum 0.312793 0.249608 0.131778 0.055413 0.312793 0.192198 0.206232 0.249608 
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Two Sample t-test 
 
The t test required for the analysis here is a modified version referred to as Welch’s t test, 
which is used when the two samples cannot be assumed to have equivalent variances and 
these variances are unknown. These tests are performed one sided and two sided here, 
separately for the gainer and loser portfolios.  
 
The null and alternative hypotheses for the one sided and two sided tests are as follows: 
 
Test 1: two sided 
𝐻0: µ𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑂 = µ𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼 
𝐻1: µ𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑂 ≠ µ𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼 
 
Reject the null hypothesis if: t statistic > critical value of t  
 
Test 2: one sided 
𝐻0: µ𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑂 = µ𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼 
𝐻1: µ𝑃𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐹𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑂 > µ𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼 
 
Reject the null hypothesis if: t statistic > critical value of t or (-)t < (-) critical value 
 
The statistics are calculated as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                        (6.1) 
Where: 
 
                                                                                                                    (6.2) 
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𝑋1 ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
𝑋2 ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
𝑠1
2 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑠2 
2 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
𝑛1𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
𝑛2 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
 
Tables 36 and 37 below summarises the t-test results for Tests 1 and 2 for the gainer and loser 
portfolios, based on a one day holding period. As seen in the table below, none of the tests 
yielded evidence to support either a significant difference in mean returns or a higher return for 
the portfolios relative to the ALSI at the 10% significance level. This contrasts with the results 
from the analysis of the Sharpe ratios, questioning the reliability of these portfolios in providing 
sustainable excess returns. The deduction of transaction costs is rendered unnecessary due to 
the absence of a statistically significant excess returns.  
 
Table 36: Test 1 and 2 results for a one day holding period 
  Gainers Losers 
Test 1 t=0.512<1.96 – Do not Reject Null t=1.29<1.96 – Do not Reject Null 
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Mean 0.000562 0.001103 
Variance 0.00174 0.000229 
Observations 1765 1765 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Degrees of freedom 2220  
Significance level 10%  
t Stat 0.51191  
P(T<=t) one-sided test 0.304382  
t Critical one-sided test 1.64554  
P(T<=t) two-sided test 0.608764  
t Critical two-sided test 1.961033   
 






Mean 0.001668 0.000441 
Variance 0.001692 0.000202 
Observations 2097 2097 
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
Degrees of freedom 2590  
Significance level 10%  
t Stat 1.291075  
P(T<=t) one-sided test 0.098396  
t Critical one-sided test 1.645442  
P(T<=t) two-sided test 0.196793  
t Critical two-sided test 1.96088   
 
6.2.2.2 Five Day Holding Period Performance 
 
The analysis based on the five day holding period provides some different results in general. 
Considering the mean Sharpe ratio for the five day holding period over the entire period, the 
losers portfolio provides a value ten-fold that of the gainers portfolio.  In addition, the 
maximum is about 60% larger than the gainers portfolio while the minimum is also more 
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extreme. Of interest is the periods in which the minimums and maximums occur, being the 
intra-crisis and post-crisis periods respectively. The incidence of these extremes in these 
periods suggest that for more than a day’s holding period, the reversals strategy takes on high 
risk and does not perform at all during financial turmoil. In periods of market recovery, it seems 
that there are very large returns available, relative to risk, but this may very much be due to low 
risk as opposed to high absolute returns. The analysis of the Sharpe ratio on its own provides 
little clarity on the reliability of the reversals strategy for excess returns.  
 













 Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers Gainers Losers 
Minimum -0.34691 -0.50718 -0.10407 -0.15215 -0.34691 -0.50718 -0.03722 -0.05441 
Maximum 0.499873 0.767081 0.110972 0.170292 0.384902 0.590652 0.499873 0.767081 
Mean 0.030781 0.34368 0.01577 0.176081 0.017483 0.19521 0.038168 0.426163 
 
Two sample t-test 
 
The same t tests as the previous section were conducted for the portfolios, but in this case 
using a five day holding period. Table 40 below summarises the results for Tests 1 and 2 for the 
gainer and loser portfolios. As seen in the table below, none of the tests yielded evidence to 
support either a significant difference in mean returns or a higher return for the gainers 
portfolio relative to the ALSI at the 10% significance level. The losers portfolio did provide 
weakly significant evidence for the null hypotheses for both tests. This provides some clarity as 
to the usefulness of the losers portfolio for a five day holding period which corroborates some 
of the findings from the Sharpe ratio. Tables 40 and 41 below summarise the test outputs as 
well.   
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Table 40: Test 1 and 2 results for a one day holding period 
  Gainers Losers 
Test 1 t=1.321<1.96 – Do not Reject Null t=-1.873<-1.96 –Reject Null 
Test 2 t=1.321<1.64 – Do not Reject Null t=-1.873<-1.64 –Reject Null 
 






Mean 0.11797 0.17151 
Variance 0.00475 0.000346 
Observations 398 398 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Degrees of freedom 435  
Significance level 10%  
t Stat 1.321  
P(T<=t) one-sided test 0.105672  
t Critical one-sided test 1.64554  
P(T<=t) two-sided test 0.35911  
t Critical two-sided test 1.961033   
 






Mean 0.05151 0.1109 
Variance 0.00324 0.000272 
Observations 398 398 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
Degrees of freedom 435  
Significance level 10%  
t Stat -1.87291  
P(T<=t) one-sided test 0.10981  
t Critical one-sided test 1.64554  
P(T<=t) two-sided test 0.04632  
t Critical two-sided test 1.961033   
 
 




In order to test the practical and economic significance of this studies’ findings for return 
reversals, a trading strategy was tested to provide portfolio returns which could be compared 
with the ALSI market benchmark. Section 6.2 presented the results for one day and five day 
holding periods. For the whole sample period, the losers (at ±5% and ±10%) portfolio provided 
larger upside and downside potential compared to the gainers portfolio on a daily basis.  On a 
weekly basis, there were better returns for gainers in times of crises due to the larger reversals 
in a crisis period, and better returns for losers in a period of market recovery when considering 
the gains rolled over for a week. On a month long horizon, the most extreme portfolio losses 
were experienced by both portfolios during the post-crisis period, which was also the case for 
portfolio gains. This is unusual given that there was strong market recovery for most of the 
post-crisis period. The annual data suggested that the gainers portfolio provided larger upside 
and downside potential compared to the losers portfolio. 
 
To provide robust results for Hypothesis 4 (an economically significant reversals trading 
strategy exists), risk and benchmark adjusted returns were calculated using the Sharpe ratio. 
For a one day holding period over all the sub-periods, the losers portfolio provided positive 
returns per unit of volatility for the overall period and all the sub-periods as well.  The gainers 
portfolio performed similarly with the exception of the post-crisis period. The analysis based on 
the five day holding period provided some different results. Considering the mean Sharpe ratio 
for the five day holding period over the entire period, the losers portfolio provides a value ten-
fold that of the gainers portfolio.  In addition, the maximum is about 60% larger than the 
gainers portfolio while the minimum is also more extreme. The outperformance of these 
portfolios relative to the ALSI did not receive statistical support based on t-tests. For both one 
day and five day holding periods, there was no statistical significance for the difference of mean 
returns between either the gainers portfolio and ALSI or the losers portfolio and ALSI. Due to 
this, Hypothesis 4 was rejected and there was no further investigation based on the deduction 
of transaction costs.  
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Chapter 7: Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research  
 
7.1 The Joint Hypothesis Problem 
 
The joint hypothesis problem is based on the challenge presented in adequately testing market 
efficiency given that an additional concurrent hypothesis is required on some model for prices. 
This model itself would present a framework on how prices occur efficiently to begin with and 
then the actual observed prices can be tested to determine whether efficiency holds. In 
practice, this approach would usually fail and lend support to the hypothesis that markets are 
inefficient. This is often due to an incomplete model which has omitted some important factors 
which are assumed to have a rational basis. There is often no need to explain what these 
factors might be, but their existence is assumed, or it cannot be proved that they do not exist. 
This in essence creates a circular logic pathway which undermines the conclusions in relation to 
market efficiency.  
 
7.2 Limited Economic Significance 
 
An important aspect of any theoretical result is the ability to extend it to the future and use it 
for some practical and realistic application. In this context, this is the question of whether a 
statistically significant result has economic significance in the financial market. Not only is a 
market application important but the horizon over which it can yield results is also a key 
matter. Much investigation of the Overreaction hypothesis has been coupled with a search for 
portfolio allocation strategies to earn excess profits. Notably, these have all been in the long 
term, which is outside the scope of this project. This project sought to fill a gap in the 
investigation of short term strategies based on overreaction and add to the international work 
on this phenomenon. There were mixed results for the economic significance of the contrarian 
strategy employed on this dissertation. Relative performance metrics based on the Sharpe ratio 
suggested positive returns but statistical tests found no significant difference between the 
portfolio returns and the ALSI which was the market benchmark. This limits the support for 
opportunities to utilise the reversals consistently.  
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7.3 The study does not investigate Behavioural Aspects 
 
Market participants may react rationally or irrationally when transacting in asset markets. The 
study of the psychological aspects which drive and direct certain responses is part of 
behavioural studies, which are far removed from the scope of this study. An investigation of 
such factors in the short term would require consideration of many psychological aspects, 
which are peripheral to the objectives of this study and to avoid over complication such an 
endeavour was avoided. The inability to investigate these effects, although due to practical and 
methodological limitations, does render this study incomplete when viewed as investor focused 
research.  
 
7.4 Non-Event attribution and specification 
 
This research project focused on a pure returns assessment of share overreaction based on 
total return index values. These returns were not distinguished based on firm specific events 
such as dividends, share options, buy backs or other potentially value adjusting events although 
an attempt was made to mitigate this issue through use of the total return index which would 
incorporate dividend and other return contributions. This is based on such events being 
reflected similarly for all shares, which may not be a realistic assumption. In addition, these 
events impact substantially on trading strategies as the share price can move significantly on 
any given day due to announcements related to these.   
 
7.5 Price impact on the reliability of the trading strategy 
 
An additional limitation is the effect that price movements might have on the reliability of the 
trading strategy derived from the results of investigating extreme short term price 
overreaction. The issue is whether the individual investor would able to trade at the previous 
closing price, which is highly unlikley on any given day. However this effect is less likely to affect 
the reliability of trading strategies based on longer horizon historical performance when 
compared to the short horizon used in this study.   
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7.6 Non-attribution to rational structural uncertainty  
 
When considering the market anomalies highlighted in this study, there is an implicit 
assumption of an ‘irrational’ view. However, there is an alternative ‘rational’ view which posits 
that these anomalies are a manifestation of risks and abnormal returns as expected due to the 
assumed inherent risks. Share specific and market risks were for the most part proxied by the 
use of returns volatility and the SAVI but other structural risks were not incorporated. Brav and 
Heaton (2002) directly compared these two competing assumptions and found that although 
they have opposing views, their mathematical and predictive similarities render them hard to 
distinguish from each other. In addition, these authors found that even if the anomalies occur 
due to irrationality, their disappearance may require some form rational learning such as the 
ability of investors to reject competing rational explanations for observed market price patterns 
(Brav and Heaton, 2002). Further investigation on this would perhaps add value in research on 
the independence or interaction of these alternative views.  
 
7.7 Suggestions for further research 
 
This section builds on the limitations of this study to provide different extensions and 
alternatives to the research in this dissertation. There were consistently significant evidence of 
reversals, however there were no excess profits available for traders based on a contrarian 
strategy. An implication of this is that an additional filter may be required to identify true 
candidate shares for such a strategy. More research with a focus on sectoral or industry based 
trading strategies would be useful as there may be a case to focus on overreaction in certain 
sectors such as resources and minerals.  
 
Another area to explore further is the investigation of overreaction based on behavioural 
aspects. This would involve the development of statistical metrics that are able to adequately 
function as financial proxies for investor actions based on behavioural tendencies which may 
lead to overreaction.  
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The final suggestion for further investigation is to track price movements specifically related to 
company announcements and news. This would involve recording all the formal 
announcements from the company as well as other general news which may impact prices and 
tagging these to large price shifts that occur within a trading day. This is difficult to execute in 
practice for even a moderate number of companies over a small horizon given that there may 
be multiple announcements for all the companies in addition to opinions and other influential 
news that may not even originate from the company itself. As investors select and act on any 
information in a complex and often unpredictable manner, any combination of information and 
personal bias may lead to price movements. This analysis would have to be combined with a 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
Chapter 2 provided a theoretical overview and literature study for the overreaction 
hypothesis. Section 2.2 contained three key theories, the Overreaction, Efficient Market and 
Uncertain Information hypotheses. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that a 
market in which all publicly available information is reflected in the market prices of assets is 
efficient.  If overreaction exists in the JSE, then it comes up against the conventionally theory 
of market efficiency, especially weak form efficiency (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985). The 
uncertain information hypothesis (UIH) asserts that the abnormal returns following both 
positive and negative price movements or events should remain positive for some time 
(Ketcher & Jordan, 1994). Behavioural finance was also covered as an area which provided 
another dimension of analysis to overreaction. 
 
Section 2.3 discussed bid-ask bounce, January, value and size effects, as well as transaction 
costs and time varying risk premiums in relation to overreaction. Section 2.4 focused on prior 
research conducted over the short term internationally, highlighting the differing evidence 
gathered over different time periods and geographies. Section 2.5 presented evidence from 
work on overreaction and reversals in South Africa, and was followed by studies on general 
returns modelling in South Africa.  Section 2.6 discussed the common methodologies used in 
all the studies of short term overreaction, namely event studies, variance modelling and 
regressions.  
 
Chapter 3 consisted of an overview of the data collection process, sample and methodology.  The 
required data will be sourced from Thomson Reuters Datastream International as well as 
Bloomberg and McGregor Bureau of Financial Analysis. Then the key issues of share liquidity 
and survivorship bias were considered with measures to circumvent these. A summary of the 
screening criteria that was used in refining the sample followed this. Furthermore, the sample 
was analysed for trends of interest in developing hypotheses 3 and 4.  
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Chapter 4 expanded on hypothesis development and the methodology. Based on a 
combination of analysis of prior literature and exploratory data analysis, some areas of 
specific research were developed as testable hypotheses to address the key research 
questions. Hypothesis 1 was that short term share return reversals exist on the JSE. 
Hypothesis 2 held that there were difference in the magnitude of upward and downward 
return reversals. Hypothesis 3 was that reversals are altered in times of Financial Turmoil. 
Last of all, hypothesis 4 stated that a profitable reversals trading strategy exists. A 
discussion of South Africans returns research informed the choice and validated some of 
the key variables used in the empirical models. Four model specifications were finalised 
based on the work of Lobe and Rieks (2011). A selection of exploratory and diagnostic 
checks were performed on the raw data and it was concluded that none of the regression 
assumptions were not violated.  
 
The prior research of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is applied was to the dataset with the results and 
analysis provided in Chapter 5. This chapter presented the results and key findings from the 
statistical analysis of the data. Section 5.2 considered the evidence from each of regression 
models and explained the results in terms of the regression variables that measured the various 
effects. The reversal, average return, size and P/E variables are significant over the one day and 
five day holding periods and were a useful suite of factors whereas the book-to-market and 
volatility variables were trivial in explaining short term overreaction. This section also compared 
the findings from prior literature, and found some matches with the prevailing evidence from 
other markets, for instance Lobe and Rieks (2011) and Choudhary and Sethi (2014).  
 
Robustness checks were then used in Section 5.3 to check for the reliability of the results using 
coefficient persistence checks. For Models 1 to 4 the coefficients for return reversals and 
average return proved to be consistent and robust irrespective of the different cut-offs. 
Average return was always the largest coefficient. Book-to-market ratio and the volatility 
measures had the most limited significance and also happened to have the smallest 
coefficients. Size and P/E were significant for smaller cut-offs and had small magnitudes in 
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general. In conclusion, the reversal, average return, size and P/E variables are significant over 
one day and five day holding periods, whereas the book-to-market and volatility variables were 
trivial in explaining short term overreaction. Section 5.4 positioned the results in relation to 
Research Hypotheses 1 to 3 in providing conclusions to these based on the results and found 
that there was strong support for the first two hypothesis but mixed evidence for hypothesis 3.  
The key contribution of this work has been to validate the existence of share price overreaction 
for very short horizons on the JSE. Common effects such as the size and value effects have also 
gained support and may yield trading strategies as well.  
 
Chapter 6 covered the practical and economic significance of this studies’ findings for return 
reversals, a trading strategy was used on past data as a comparative measure by testing it 
relative to the ALSI market benchmark. Section 6.2 elaborated on the methodology with 
respect to portfolio selection, allocation and return measurement. Section 6.3 presented the 
results for one day and five day holding periods and contextualized the results respect to 
Hypothesis 4. The losers portfolio provided larger upside and downside potential compared to 
the gainers portfolio on a daily basis.  On a weekly basis, there were better returns for gainers 
in times of crises due to the larger reversals in a crisis period, and better returns for losers in a 
period of market recovery when considering the gains rolled over for a week. On a month long 
horizon, the most extreme portfolio losses were experienced by both portfolios during the 
post-crisis period, which was also the case for portfolio gains. 
 
Based on Sharpe ratios the portfolios outperformed the ALSI but this did not receive statistical 
support based on t-tests. For both one day and five day holding periods, there was no statistical 
significance for the difference of mean returns between either the gainers portfolio and ALSI or 
the losers portfolio and ALSI. Due to this, Hypothesis 4 was rejected and there was no further 
investigation based on the deduction of transaction costs. Further work on analysing this 
phenomenon in different sectors may yield more focused strategies that are able to capture 
abnormal returns better than a market wide selection.    
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Chapter 7 highlighted six limitations that constrained the level of research and suggested 
different extensions on the scope of the work in this research project. The first limitation was 
the joint hypothesis problem which implies a circular argument when testing market efficiency 
which hindered the potential for the findings to be applied in a meaningful way in testing 
market efficiency. The second limitation was limited economic significance due to no statistical 
support for a contrarian trading strategy as a means to outperform the market. Another key 
limitation is a lack of means to directly investigate behavioural aspects in the scope of this 
work, which leaves a large area of analysis untapped. The fourth limitation was the inability to 
identify or account for every single event or news item which may trigger overreaction thus 
rendering the testing environment poorly controlled for with respect to these factors. The next 
limitation was the price impact on the reliability of trading strategy outcomes and the final 
limitation was a lack of specific investigation on the ‘rational’ view of anomalies. The 
suggestions for further research involved focusing the investigation of overreaction to specific 
business sectors and incorporating behavioural aspects as well as announcements into the 
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Appendix A: Residuals Versus Independent Variable Plots 
 
The diagnostic check for non-linearity is a collection of regression error values (residuals) plotted against 
the different independent variables. A systematic pattern in these plots indicates some non-linearity. 
The figures below represent residual versus plots and there are no systematic patterns discernible 
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